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ABSTRACT 
This thesis addresses the importance of ideational determinants of cohesion or 
discord in the Northeast Asian alliances in which the United States has major security 
interests. Numerous studies have explored the rationale, substance and purpose of these 
alliances. However, previous studies have been dominated by realists and related balance 
of power/threat/self-interest approaches and do not provide a clear explanation for 
unexpected developments among existing alliances. In explaining recent changes within 
the alliances, relatively little attention has been given to alternative approaches, such as 
social constructivism. By applying social constructivist theory to the PRC-DPRK and 
U.S.-ROK alliances in a comparative study, this thesis finds that the increasing 
divergence of PRC and DPRK identity, values, perception of common interests, and 
security concerns has led to growing discord and mistrust in their alliance, while the 
increasing convergence of thinking and common values between Washington and Seoul 
has become a stronger foundation for their alliance. The thesis concludes with some 
theoretical and practical implications, as well as policy recommendations for enhancing 
alliance cohesion. 
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I. INTRODUCTION  
A. PURPOSE 
The research question addressed in this thesis emerged from unexpected 
developments among the post-Cold War alliances within the Northeast Asian region. The 
U.S.-Republic of Korea (ROK) alliance, which was created to defend the ROK, has 
become stronger in recent years, even as the Democratic People’s of Republic of Korea’s 
(DPRK) relative power has declined and its nuclear program frozen. At the same time, 
the People’s Republic of China (PRC)-DPRK alliance, which defends the DPRK, has 
faced far greater threats from the formidable United States and ROK. Yet this alliance 
has weakened since the mid-1990s. 
Existing International Relations (IR) theories on alliances, especially realism 
(which sees alliance formation and dissolution as based on the balance of power or the 
balance of threat), do not explain why new alliances were not formed against the U.S.,  
the sole remaining superpower since the Soviet Union collapsed. Similarly, such theories 
cannot explain why existing alliances against the U.S. and its allies, such as the PRC-
DPRK alliance, have been weakening. Many different schools suggest that a state’s self-
interest is the main motivation for its alliances. However, few theories provide a clear 
explanation of why Beijing seems to be recalculating its interests and why its bonds with 
the DPRK are steadily loosening. 
The expectation of realists—that when opposition power weakens or disappears, 
old disagreements among allies resurface, causing either “dissension in the alliance or 
coalition breakdown”1—cannot explain existing alliances, such as the NATO, U.S.-ROK, 
and U.S.-Japan alliances. These continue to be rated as firm alliances, even though no 
superpower has threatened the allies or the United States since 1991. At the same time, 
neither the U.S.-ROK nor PRC-DPRK alliance has followed the expectations of liberal  
 
 
1  Barry B. Hughes, Continuity and Change in World Politics: Competing Perspectives (Upper Saddle 
River, NJ: Prentice Hall, 1997), 556. 
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theory that alliances should have a continuous process of “debate, competitions, and even 
conflict over the limited sources and attention” to maximize benefits of international 
arrangements while minimizing costs.2 
The inability of existing IR theories to explain changes in the PRC-DPRK and 
U.S.-ROK alliances requires discovering new determinants of the strength or weakness of 
alliance cohesion, rather than focusing exclusively on power, threat, and interests. This 
thesis does not deny the relevance of factors emphasized by existing IR theories. 
However, this thesis claims that alliance cohesion in Northeast Asia is not solely a 
product of the “externalities of material and individualistic properties,”3  and that the 
explanation of alliance cohesion must be supplemented by “ideational factors and 
processes,”4 such as collective identity, culture, and norms. Specifically, this thesis calls 
attention to significant changes in both Chinese and South Korean collective identities 
that have increasingly affected their security policies, external threat perceptions, 
expectations regarding their alliances, and attitudes toward their allies.  
B. IMPORTANCE  
The changes in cohesiveness of the existing alliances and their determinants are 
worth studying for three reasons. First, in contrast to previous studies of alliances focused 
on European alliance formation and dissolution, changes in existing alliances in 
Northeast Asia have received less attention despite the increasing importance of U.S. 
interests in Asia. Second, in order to supplement the deficit of existing IR theories 
explaining the anomalies of the U.S.-ROK and the PRC-DPRK alliances, analysts need to 
consider determinants other than power, threat, and self-interest for the changes in those 




2  Jae-Jung Suh, Power, Interest, and Identity in Military Alliance (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 
2007), 6. 
3  Ramzy A. Mardini, “Socializing Realism’s Balance of Power: Collective Identity as Alliance 
Formation in Iraq” (Ph.D. diss., Ohio State University, 2008), 1. 
4  Jae-Jung Suh, Peter J. Katzenstein, and Allen Carlson, Rethinking Security in East Asian: Identity, 
Power, and Efficiency (Stanford, CA: Stanford Univ. Press, 2004), 9. 
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to recognize the current changes and their determinants in U.S. alliances, as well as the 
alliances of its potential competitors, in order to take appropriate measures to preserve 
U.S. interests in Northeast Asia. 
In this respect, Northeast Asia’s two anomalous alliances are good illustrations of 
dynamic changes in states’ collective identities and the impact of collective identity on 
alliance cohesion. In other words, these two case studies can contribute to constructing a 
cause-and-effect relationship between an ideational factor (as an independent variable) 
and alliance cohesion (as a dependent variable). The main hypothesis examined in this 
thesis is that the PRC and ROK have gone through significant changes in their collective 
identities since the late 1970s and mid-1980s, respectively, and these changes have led to 
shifts in the cohesion of their respect alliances with the DPRK and United States. 
C.  LITERATURE REVIEW  
Three bodies of literature are relevant for this thesis and are introduced in this 
section. Research on the main alliances of the two Koreas provides the empirical raw 
materials for this thesis. Research on collective identity and alliance cohesion is used to 
identify the main independent and dependent variables for the study. Finally, theories of 
alliances supply potential alternative explanations for the changes in alliance cohesion 
studied here. 
1. The PRC-DPRK and U.S.-ROK Alliances 
The PRC and DPRK, as communist neighbors with ideological and cultural 
affinity, fought shoulder-to-shoulder against the “imperialist American invasion”5 from 
1950 to 1953, without having an official alliance treaty. This relationship of “flesh and 
blood” was officially upgraded through the “PRC-DPRK Treaty of Friendship, 
Cooperation and Mutual Assistance” in 1961. During the Cold War, the DPRK provided 
the PRC with a “crucial buffer”6 against U.S. military intervention, and sometimes with 
ideological support against the Soviet Union’s revisionism. At the same time, the value of 
 
5  Immanuel Hsu, The Rise of Modern China (New York: Oxford Univ. Press, 2000), 661–662. 
6  You Ji, “China and North Korea: a fragile relationship of strategic convenience,” Journal of 
Contemporary China, Vol. 10, No. 28 (August 2001), 387. 
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the PRC to the DPRK was enormous; the DPRK received legitimacy for ruling the 
northern part of the Korean Peninsula from its communist ally, and was able to protect its 
regime against formidable U.S.-led alliances thanks to the PRC’s patronage.7 
However, following the death of Mao Zedong in September 1976, the PRC, led 
by Deng Xiaoping, started to recognize the extent of changes in the non-socialist world 
and the revolution in science and technology that began in the previous decades. This led 
Deng and the other Chinese leaders to instigate an “era of reform,”8 focused on political, 
economic, and social reform, and the “open-door policy,” based on a new Chinese 
ideational platform characterized as “socialism with Chinese characteristics.” 9  These 
ideational changes were continued by Deng’s successors. The Chinese had reflected on 
and altered their “broadly accepted representation of the state,” which this thesis refers to 
as “collective identity,” with increasing effects on their foreign policies and relationships 
with their allies. As a result, Beijing signed a peace treaty with Tokyo in 1978, 
normalized diplomatic relations with Washington in 1979, restored friendly relations with 
the Soviet Union in 1989, and officially recognized the ROK in 1992, while urging 
Pyongyang to follow the Chinese style of reform. In addition, since the mid-1990s, 
Beijing has worked to counter the “China threat” perception and convince its neighbors 
that the PRC is a “benign and peaceful rising power.” 10  The Chinese have put an 
emphasis on their nation’s reputation as a responsible power. 
Since the reform policies launched in the late 1970s by Deng Xiaoping, the PRC-
DPRK alliance has cooled, as witnessed by a variety of military and diplomatic 
developments. The North Korean leadership criticized almost every element of Deng’s 
reform policy and sometimes called Deng a “traitor to socialism.”11  This is because 
 
7  Ji, “China and North Korea: a fragile relationship of strategic convenience,” 387–388. 
8  Peter R. Moody, “The Evolution of China’s National Interest: Implications for Taiwan,” in  Identity 
and Change in East Asian Conflicts: The Cases of China, Taiwan, and the Koreas, eds., Shale A. Horowitz, 
Uk Heo and Alexander C. Tan (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2007), 32. 
9  Alan Lawrence, China Under Communism (London, UK: Routledge, 2008), 107–122. 
10  Susan L. Shirk, China, Fragile Superpower (New York: Oxford Univ. Press, 2007), 105–112. 
11  Gregory, J. Moore, “How North Korea threatens China’s interests: Understanding Chinese 
‘duplicity’ on the North Korean nuclear issue,” International Relations of the Asia-Pacific, Vol. 8, No.1 
(January 2008), 7. 
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Deng’s new reform policies, based on socialism with Chinese characteristics, were 
conceived as threats to the ideology of “Juche (independence and self-reliance)” and 
“genuine Marxism-Leninism,” which have been the central to the DPRK’s collective 
identity.12 Specifically, the chaos of the 1989 democracy movement and the Tiananmen 
crisis in the PRC, motivated by economic and social interaction with the outside world, 
gave a shock to Pyongyang and complicated the relationship with the PRC. 
Moreover, Beijing has upgraded its fast-growing economic, political, and military 
ties with the ROK since 1992. Chinese leaders clearly no longer regard South Korea as a 
potential enemy and think that the older commitment, especially from the DPRK side, 
has been unreliable.13 In addition, although the PRC, unlike Russia, did not revise its 
alliance treaty, many Chinese and Western analysts doubt whether the PRC-DPRK 
military obligations could be fulfilled in case of war against the U.S.-ROK alliance. In 
fact, at present, the PRC and the DPRK rarely agree on historical ties, ideological stances, 
political and diplomatic programs, or military exchanges.14 
On the other hand, the United States and ROK did not share a common ideology, 
culture, political system, or common interests in the region until the outbreak of the 
Korean War in 1950. Right before the war occurred in June 1950, statements by President 
Truman and Secretary of State Acheson that Korea was outside the U.S. defense 
perimeter in Asia indicated that Korea lacked significant value in terms of U.S. interests. 
However, during the Korean War, both countries started recognizing the necessity of an 
alliance, resulting in the U.S.-ROK mutual defense treaty of October 1, 1953.15 However, 
their initial perspectives on the alliance were different. From the ROK’s perspective, the 
alliance was essential to help recover from the war, build up its strength in the contest 
with its rival, and defend itself against strong physical threats from North Korea. The 
 
12  Charles K. Armstrong, The North Korean Revolution, 1945–1950 (Ithaca, NY: Cornell Univ. Press, 
2003), 2; Ji, “China and North Korea: a fragile relationship of strategic convenience,” 390. 
13  Scott Zhou, “All teeth and lips – for now,” Asia Times, October 21. 2006, 
http://www.atimes.com/atimes/China/HJ21Ad01.html (accessed March 12, 2009). 
14  Ibid., 388.  
15  ROK Ministry of National Defense, ROK-U.S. Alliance and USFK (Seoul: ROK Ministry of 
National Defense Press, 2003), 37. 
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United States saw the alliance not only as a useful means of defending the ROK against 
the DPRK, but also as a meaningful signal to the rest of world of its commitment to 
supporting peace and democracy. 
Domestic political instability in the ROK that led to the assassination of President 
Park Chung-hee in 1979, and international pressure with the “Third Wave” of 
democratization, pushed South Korea to adopt rapid democratization and globalization.16 
Since the mid-1980s, this transition to democracy and globalization not only improved 
South Korean human rights and brought about its political development, but also 
established healthy grounds for its relationships with democratic allies and the 
international community.  
As the ROK economy continued to enjoy remarkable growth during the 1970s 
and 1980s, with a rapid expansion in middle-class and highly educated citizens, public 
hope for democracy, human rights, and equality started to receive attention. The ROK 
democratic movement peaked in 1988 with the Seoul Olympic Games. 17  The 
democratization and globalization movements in the ROK brought both challenges and 
opportunities to the U.S.-ROK alliance. A series of temporary turbulent moments arose in 
the U.S.-ROK alliance in the late 1990s through early 2000s, caused by fluctuations in 
South Korean collective identity, including growing anti-American sentiment as an 
extension of South Korean nationalism, progressive ideas in government policies, 
divisions in South Korean public opinion, and the younger generation’s changing 
perceptions of North Korea and the United States.18  
Nevertheless, through the transition of democratization and globalization, the 
ROK has become more inclined to get involved in regional and international affairs and 
encourage domestic political debates over their government policies. Today, both 
 
16  Uk Heo and Jung-Yeop Woo, “South Korea’s Response: Democracy, Identity, and Strategy,” in  
Identity and Change in East Asian Conflicts: The Cases of China, Taiwan, and the Koreas, eds., Horowitz, 
Heo, and Tan, 150–151.  
17  Heo and Woo, “South Korea’s Response: Democracy, Identity, and Strategy,” 151. 
18  Chung-in Moon and Seung-Won Suh, “Identity Politics, Nationalism, and the Future of Northeast 
Asian Order,” in The United States and Northeast Asia: Debate, Issues, and New Order, eds., G. John 
Ikenberry and Chung-In Moon (Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, Inc., 2008), 203–206. 
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countries seek to strengthen the U.S.-ROK alliance as strategically crucial in the twenty-
first century, while simultaneously pursuing “common values, interests, and norms.”19 In 
fact, Washington and Seoul agreed to expand the role of the alliance into regional and 
global security issues as well as non-traditional security issues beyond the theater of the 
Korean peninsula. Subsequently, they have attempted to upgrade and diversify military 
cooperation, joint exercises, diplomatic and military communication channels, U.S. 
military bases in Korean territory, and the ROK’s international responsibilities. For these 
reasons, the U.S.-ROK alliance is still rated among the most formidable, durable alliances 
in the world. 
2. State Identity 
This thesis examines the importance of state identity (a state’s collective identity) 
as an independent variable for explaining alliance dynamics. Collective identity has been 
comprehensively analyzed by the school of social constructivism, which argues that 
identity, norms, and culture influence state action and behavior. Although constructivists’ 
definitions of collective identity are not constant, depending on “issue, time, and place, 
and whether they are bilateral, regional, or global,” 20  and they are frequently 
interchanged with similar concepts of state/national identity, norms, and culture,21 it is 
not a key point of this thesis to distinguish each definition of these terms. Instead, this 
thesis focuses on general ideas concerning collective identity and its formation and 
influence on a nation and its alliances.  
Alexander Wendt defines collective identity as a “basis for feelings of solidarity, 
community, and loyalty and thus for collective definitions of interest.” 22  From his 
perspective, collective identity creates representations of self, others, enemies, and allies, 
 
19  Alexander A. Arvizu, “A New Beginning for the U.S.-South Korea Strategic Alliance,” statement 
before the House Foreign Affairs Committee in Washington D.C. on April 23, 2008, 
http://seoul.usembassy.gov/rok_042308.html. 
20  Alexander Wendt, “Collective Identity Formation and the International State,” American Political 
Science Review, Vol. 88, No. 2 (June 1994), 6. 
21  Maxym Alexandrov, “The Concept of State Identity in International Relations: A Theoretical 
Analysis,” Journal of International Development and Cooperation, Vol. 10, No. 1 (September 2003), 34. 
22  Ibid., 3. 
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while being shaped and reshaped by “inter-subjective internal and external structures,”23 
and it promotes people’s willingness to act on “generalized principles of conduct.” 24 
Hence, changes in the collective identity of a nation mean that the nation’s view of both 
its domestic and international contexts has changed and, consequently, its government 
policies are expected to be changed. 25  On the other hand, Peter Katzenstein—who 
defines identity as a “shorthand label for varying constructions of nation- and 
statehood” 26 —argues that collective identities are “produced, reproduced, and 
transformed as they affect the prospects for social learning and the diffusion of collective 
norms and individual beliefs.”27 He also argues that a state is a social actor, and thus it is 
embedded in “social rules and conventions” that constitute its collective identity, which 
also interacts with different social environments domestically and internationally. 28  
Similarly, Marc Lynch uses the term “identity” in a broader context of collective 
definitions of self. He defines identity as “not only the concepts held by a state’s leaders, 
but the set of beliefs about the nature and purpose of the state expressed in public 
articulations of state actions and ideals.” 29  From his perspective, a state’s “public 
sphere,” formed through public contestation, can influence the state’s identity and 
behavior because huge public discussions or debates on identity, values, and interests in 
many countries are seen at certain moments
More recently, Maxym Alexandrov defines collective identity as a set of broadly 
accepted representations of a state, particularly in its relation to another state, together 
 
23  Alexander Wendt, Social Theory of International Politics (New York: Cambridge Univ. Press, 
1999), 21, 342. 
24  Ibid., 4. 
25  Ibid., 429. 
26  Peter J. Katzenstein, “Introduction,” in The Culture of National Security: Norms and Identity in 
World Politics, ed., Katzenstein (New York: Columbia Univ. Press, 1996), 3–9. 
27  Suh, Katzenstein, and Carlson, Rethinking Security in East Asian: Identity, Power, and Efficiency, 
9. 
28  Katzenstein, “Introduction,” in The Culture of National Security: Norms and Identity in World 
Politics, 9–11. 
29  Marc Lynch, “Abandoning Iraq: Jordan’s alliances and the politics of state identity,” Security 
Studies, Vol. 8, No. 2, (December 1998), 349. 
30  Ibid., 349–351. 
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uestions of  
                                                
with “corresponding beliefs about the appropriate behavior, rights or responsibilities.”31 
Sheldon Stryker also argues that collective identity is frequently conceptualized culturally 
and is equivalent to the “ideas, beliefs, and practices of a society.”
32 Chung-in Moon and 
Seung-Won Suh assert that the significance of national collective identity is its strong 
influence on shared norms, interests, and images of other countries, which ultimately 
affects a state’s behavior.33 In a similar vein, Shale Horowitz, Uk Heo, and Alexander 
Tan define national identity in Identity and Changes in East Asian Conflicts as “the group 
that the state is supposed to serve and protect,” which is associated with “national cultural, 
economic, political, and geopolitical goals” that the state is supposed to promote.34 They 
believe that national identity has strong implications for defining national interests when 
looking for the reasons for continuing conflicts between the ROK and DRRK, and 
between the PRC and the Republic of China (ROC), despite the transformation of each 
state’s national identity since the end of the Cold War. From their perspective, changing 
national identities interact with changing external conditions to influence “political 
competition and leadership outcomes,” and thus national security objectives. 35  In 
addition, Brad Glosserman and Scott Snyder, who reveal that Northeast Asian states’ 
identity crises affect their alliance system, view national identity as “values” that the 
majority of a state’s people want to preserve, which can be measured by public opinion 
on self-perception or other-perception.36 They emphasize the function of state identity in 





31  Alexandrov, “The Concept of State Identity in International Relations: A Theoretical Analysis,” 39. 
32  Sheldon Stryker, “Identity Competition: Key to Differential Social Movement Participation,” in 
Sheldon Stryker, Timothy J. Owens, and Robert W. White, eds., Self, Identity, and Social Movements 
(Minneapolis, MN: University of Minnesota Press, 2000), 22. 
33  Moon and Suh, “Identity Politics, Nationalism, and the Future of Northeast Asian Order,” 194. 
34  Horowitz, Heo and Tan, eds., Identity and Change in East Asian Conflicts: The Cases of China, 
Taiwan, and the Koreas, 3. 
35  Ibid. 
36 Brad Glosserman and Scott Snyder, “Confidence and Confusion: National Identity and Security 
Alliances in Northeast Asia,” Issues and Insights, Vol. 8, No. 16 (September 2008), 1–3. 
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ry for politicians to consider public perceptions as they 
influence policy formulation.37 
pective of “collective power, ideology, communication, and national security 
issues.”
                                                
 
state identity have emerged as “irresistible tools for politicians to gain domestic political 
support,” and thus it is necessa
3. Alliance Cohesion 
Analysts have advanced both broad and narrow definitions of alliances. George 
Liska, a pioneer of the study of alliances, defines an alliance as “an event in politics as is 
conflict,” arguing that an alliance associates “like-minded actors in the hope of 
overcoming their rivals.”38 From his view, an alliance, as a military coalition, is essential 
in explaining international relations. Donald Zagoria, Christopher Bladen, Ole Hosti, 
Terrence Hopmann and John Sullivan are other scholars who interpret alliances in a 
wider pers
39 
In contrast, Robert Osgood, who studies alliance politics through NATO, limits 
his definition of an alliance to the military aspect, arguing that an alliance is common 
defense through the use of military power.40 According to his later definition, an alliance 
refers to “a formal agreement that pledges states to cooperate in using their military 
resources against a specific state or states and usually obligates one or more of the 
signatories to use force, or to consider the use of force, in specified circumstances.”41 In 
criticizing Liska’s and Zagoria’s broader definitions, George Modelski distinguishes 
between alliances and alignment. Modelski argues that alliances are directly concerned 
 
37 Glosserman and Snyder, “Confidence and Confusion: National Identity and Security Alliances in 
Northeast Asia.” 
38  George Liska, Nations in Alliance: The Limits of Interdependence, (Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins 
Press, 1962), 301. 
39  Donald S. Zagoria, The Sino-Soviet Conflict, 1956–1961 (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 
1962), 484; Ole R. Holsti, Terrence P. Hopmann and John D. Sullivan, Unity and Disintegration in 
International Alliances: Comparative Studies (Toronto, Canada: John Wiley & Sons, Inc., 1973), 4; 
Friedman, Bladen and Rosen, Alliance in International Politics (Boston, MA: Allyn and Bacon, 1970), 121. 
40  Robert Endicott Osgood, NATO, the Entangling Alliance (Chicago, IL: University of Chicago 
Press, 1962), 416. 
41  Robert E. Osgood, Alliances and American Foreign Policy (Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins Press, 
1968), 171. 
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due to their 
commit
r plans, or the amount of support to 
be prov
                                                
with defense matters and military collaboration, while “alignments” can be regarded as 
referring to “all type of international political cooperation.” 42  Julian Friedman, 
Christopher Bladen, Steven Rosen, K. Holsti and Glenn Snyder also distinguish alliances 
from other experiences of diplomatic coalitions and international cooperation, such as 
integration, multinational community building, and economic partnerships, 
ments by treaty and the degree of military integration among allies.43 
In a similar manner, definitions of alliance cohesion vary from narrow to much 
broader interpretations, depending on the definitions of an alliance. Liska sees alliance 
cohesion as the degree to which allies stay together and act together, which is determined 
by “ideologies and diplomatic style, consultations and compromise, capabilities and 
pressure, and pretensions and coercion within the alliance.” 44  On the other hand, 
Freidman, Bladen, and Rosen argue that the degree of cohesion is relative to “its vitality 
rather than durability” and that agreement among allies regarding the sharing of costs and 
rewards is the most important determinant of the degree of alliance cohesion. 45  In 
addition, Holsti, who distinguishes alliances from other forms of international 
cooperation, asserts that alliance cohesion can be altered by three factors: changes in the 
essential purpose of the alliance, incompatibility of the major social and political values 
of the allies, and development of nuclear weapons.46 From Snyder’s perspective, because 
alliance cohesion is determined by conflict and common interests of allies, allying states 
continue bargaining over levels of preparedness, wa
ided in crisis confrontations with enemies.47  
 
42  George Modelski, “The Study of Alliances: A Review,” The Journal of Conflict Resolution, Vol. 7, 
No. 4 (December 1963), 769–776.  
43  Julian R. Friedman, Christopher Bladen and Steven Rosen, Alliance in International Politics 
(Boston, MA: Allyn and Bacon, 1970), 383; K. J. Holsti, “Diplomatic Coalitions and Military Alliances” in 
Alliance in International Politics (Boston, MA: Allyn and Bacon, 1970), 93–103; Glenn H. Snyder, 
Alliance Politics (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1997), 3–4. 
44  Liska, Nations in Alliance: The Limits of Interdependence, 61–116. 
45  Friedman, Bladen and Rosen, Alliance in International Politics, 288. 
46  Holsti, “Diplomatic Coalitions and Military Alliances,” 99-103. 
47  Snyder, Alliance Politics, 3. 
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s, whether allies facilitate cooperation in production and 
develop
ture draws attention to three core elements of 
cohesion: agreement on alliance purpose, extent of military cooperation, and extent of 
econom
                                                
Although alliance cohesion is constantly changing, which makes it difficult to 
measure at any given time, some scholars have sought to evaluate alliance cohesion in a 
quantitative manner. Notable are Henry Teune and Sig Synnestvedt, who developed 
fourteen variables as indices to measure international alignment in 1965, such as military 
alliances, military presence, military aid, visits by heads of state and of government, 
important visitors other than heads of state and of government, protests and expulsions of 
diplomatic personnel, educational and cultural exchanges, and anti-ally state riots.48 More 
recently, Charles Kupchan, in examining intra-alliance behavior of the states within 
NATO and of the Persian Gulf states, asserts that alliance cohesion can be measured 
along three dimensions: joint operations or military assistance to each other, forms of 
compromise on policy issues through official statements and documents, and economic 
contributions to collective defense capability.49  Victor Cha suggests that an alliance’s 
success is measured by six aspects: how much an alliance serves as a facilitator of power 
accretion and projection, whether allies operate under a unified command, how much 
allies share common tactics and doctrine through joint training, how much allies promote 
a division of security role
ment of military equipment, and how much allies create political support among 
domestic constituencies.50  
Taken as a whole, this litera
ic contribution to the alliance. 
 
48  Henry Teune and Sig Synnestvedt, “Diplomatic Coalitions and Military Alliance.” in Friedman, 
Bladen, and Rosen, Alliance in International Politics, 321. 
49  Charles A. Kupchan, “NATO and the Persian Gulf: Examining Intra-Alliance Behavior,” 
International Organization, Vol. 42, No. 2 (Spring 1988), 317–326. 
50  Kurt Campbell, Victor Cha, Lindsey Ford, Nirav Patel, Randy Schriver, and Vikram Singh, Going 
Global: The Future of the U.S.-South Korea Alliance (Washington D.C.: Center for a New American 
Security, 2009), 12. 
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, Kenneth Waltz defines 
egemonic bid” and 
bandwagoning
ater the global imbalance of power is, the greater the 
motive to form
no other superpower threatens the allies or the United States, shows the limitations of 
                                                
4. Existing IR Theories on Alliances 
a. Power-Based Theory 
Most previous studies on alliances are dominated by the classical realist 
perspective, i.e., the argument that changes in the balance of power influence alliance 
politics. From the balance of power perspective, balance means actual or constructed 
equality of military capability among the great powers, to prevent one state/alliance from 
achieving dominance. In Theory of International Politics
balancing as “joining with the weaker side in an effort to prevent a h
 as “joining [a] stronger coalition.” Waltz argues that balancing should be 
more common in the anarchical international system. 51  Similarly, Hans Morgenthau 
argues that alliances are often formed based on the “function of preserving the status 
quo.”52 John Mearsheimer adds that balance of power logic often causes great powers to 
form alliances and cooperate against common enemies.53  
Using the balance of power logic, alliance cohesion is relatively flexible 
and weak because alliances can be formed or dissolved by great powers depending on 
their needs. In other words, the gre
 and maintain alliances. For this reason, Robert Kann argues that, based on 
balance of power, allies need to maintain a minimum level of alliance cohesion in order 
to sustain the alliance.54 Barry Hughes expects that when opposition power weakens, old 
disagreements among alliance partners will resurface, causing either dissension in the 
alliance or coalition breakdown.55 
However, the fact that numerous alliances, such as NATO, the U.S.-ROK 
and the U.S.-Japan alliances, continue to be evaluated as very firm alliances even though 
 
51  Kenneth N. Waltz, Theory of International Politics (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1979), 263–265. 
52  Hans J. Morgenthau, Politics among Nations: The Struggle for Power and Peace (New York: 
Knopf, 1972), 43. 
53  John J. Mearsheimer, The Tragedy of Great Power Politics (New York: Norton, 2001), 52–53. 
54  Robert A. Kann, “Alliance versus Ententes,” World Politics, Vol. 28, No. 4 (July 1976), 612. 
55  Hughes, Continuity and Change in World Politics: Competing Perspectives, 556. 
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er 
South Korea. Moreover, a realist perspective does not provide an answer to questions 




mphasize self-interest as the motive of alliances. Critics such as Randall Schweller 
rgue that Walt defines bandwagoning too narrowly, to encompass only the coercive or 
balance of power theory. In actuality, the U.S.-ROK alliance was created not only by the 
demand of a strong power, the United States, but also by the strong demand of the weak
y has no new alliance yet been fo
ter the demise of the Soviet Union?” For these reasons, this perspective is 
criticized by other schools of thought for focusing only on material variables and 
downplaying the importance of domestic and ideational factors in alliance decisions.56 
b. Threat-Based Theory 
In addition to using the concept of power to explain alliances and alliance 
cohesion, some realists argue that the motivation to form alliances come not from 
imbalances of power due to the sudden advent of a superpower, but from a state’s threat 
perception.57
58
 Walt argues that a state’s alliance choice is driven by an “imbalance of 
threat,” which is evaluated by the other side’s “aggregate power, geographic proximity, 
offensive capability, and the perceived aggressiveness of its intentions.”  By recasting 
the previous balance of power theory as the balance of threat theory, Walt redefines 
balancing as “allying with others against the prevailing threat,” and b
th the source of danger,” and concludes that states usually balance and 
rarely bandwagon.59 In such threat-based alliance theory, the greater the threat perceived 
by a weaker state, the stronger the motive for alliance formation and cohesion. In other 
words, a weaker state perceiving a strong threat has a greater motive to ally with a 
stronger power to balance against the perceived threat from its enemies.  
However, the balance of threat theory is criticized by realists who 
e
a
                                                 
56  Randall L. Schweller, “Bandwagoning for Profit: Bringing the Revisionist State Back in,” 
Inte
Y: Cornell Univ. Press, 1987), 21–26. 
ry of International Politics, 263–265. 
rnational Security, Vol. 19, No. 1 (Summer 1994), 74. 
57  Stephan M. Walt, The Origin of Alliance (Ithaca, N
58  Waltz, Theo
59  Ibid., 265. 
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yo in 1945. These two cases show that, to some extent, these  
 
iables, such as aggregate power, 
military capabilities, and geographic distance. Ji Hyo-Keun claims that the temporary 
deterioration of the U.S. e to changes in the 
DPRK’s physi
                                                
compulsory aspect of the concept.60 From Schweller’s perspective, the balance of threat 
theory does not explain why Italy declared war against France in 1940 or why Moscow 
declared war against Tok
 
states neither chose to balance against a stronger side nor acted based on threats from the 
other states.61 Instead, they bandwagoned with the strongest side, in the hopes of making 
territorial or other gains.  
In addition, most realists in the 1990s, including Mearsheimer, Wesson, 
Cohen and Snyder, expected that as the bipolar confrontation and threats diminished, 
NATO would lose its importance and internal cohesion.62 However, reality did not turn 
out the way the realists expected. Since the Cold War, NATO has expanded its influence 
into the Eastern European countries and accepted many of them as NATO members. 
Numerous research studies have analyzed why the realists’ expectations did not match 
reality. One significant reason is that although threat-based theory emphasizes threat 
perception, which involves cognitive perspectives such as state’s intention, history, and 
identity, the theory focuses mainly on material var
-ROK alliance in the early 2000s was not du
cal threats, but because of domestic growth in South Korean nationalism, 
autonomy, and self-confidence, as well as Washington’s new perspective toward its allies 
and partners after the September 11 terrorist attacks.63 
 
60  Schweller, “Bandwagoning for Profit: Bringing the Revisionist State Back In,” 81. 
61  Schweller, “Bandwagoning for Profit: Bringing the Revisionist State Back In,” 82. 
62  Eliot A. Cohen, “The Long-Term Crisis of the Alliance,” Foreign Affairs, Vol. 61, No. 2 (Winter 
1982/1983), 325–343; John J. Mearsheimer, “Why We Will Soon Miss the Cold War,” The Atlantic 
Monthly, Vol. 266, No. 2 (August 1990), 35–50; Glenn H. Synder, “Alliances, Balance, and Stability,” 
International Organization, Vol. 45, No. 1 (Winter 1991); Robert G. Wesson, International Relations in 
Transition (Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice Hall, 1990), 306. 
63  Ji Hyo-Keun, “Alliance Security Culture and Alliance Cohesion” (Ph.D. diss., Yonsei University, 
2006), 38. 
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 rm an asymmetric alliance with a stronger state. In Morrow’s view, some 
states would re
t numerous security benefits of 
alliances, including deterrence of attack, defense capability against attack, preclusion of 
alli r 
     
c. Self-Interest-Based Theory 
In rejecting power or threat-based theories, some realists criticize these 
approaches for focusing only on security issues and failing to consider other interests that 
might incline a nation to ally with the stronger side. For instance, Schweller, Sweeney 
and Fritz reveal that bandwagoning, or allying with the stronger side, is more common in 
the international system because alliances are actually formed on the basis of common 
interests rather than power distribution alone.64 By allying, states achieve their particular 
goals in security and non-security issues relatively easily. In other words, most states 
would rather not pursue balancing because it imposes high costs on them. Instead, 
through bandwagoning, an alliance becomes a “means to profit,” as Schweller remarks.65 
In addition, James Morrow, who studies asymmetric alliances, argues that security 
concerns like balancing power or threat are not the only determinants of a weaker state’s 
decision to fo
linquish their autonomy to gain security by allying with the stronger side, 
while other states would relinquish security to gain autonomy by allying with the weaker 
side.66 Michael Barnett and Jack Levy also find that, particularly for countries in the 
Third World, the realist perspectives undervalue the “role of state-society relations and 
internal threats and constraints,” such as political and economic problems, in alliance 
formation.67 
David Lalman, David Newman, and Glenn Snyder enumerate the costs 
and benefits of alliances. 68  For example, Snyder lis s 
ance or alignment between the partner and the opponent, and increased control o
                                            
64  Kevin Sweeney and Paul Fritz, “Jumping on the Bandwagon: An Interest-Based Explanation for 
Grea
 the Revisionist State Back in,” 72. 
Summer 1991), 369–379. 
, “Alliance Formation and National Security,” International 
Inte ol. 16, No. 4 (January 1991), 240. 
t Power Alliances,” The Journal of Politics, Vol. 66, No. 2 (May 2004), 429. 
65  Schweller, “Bandwagoning for Profit: Bringing
66  Bruce Bueno de Mesquita and James D. Morrow, “Sorting Through the Wealth of Notions,” 
International Security, Vol. 24, No. 2 (Fall 1999), 61. 
67  Michael Barnett and Jack Levy, “Domestic Sources of Alliances and Alignments: The Case of 
Egypt,” International Organization, Vol. 45, No. 3 (




o omic calculations. In addition, from an 
interest-based ory to have continuous “debates, 
competitions, and even conflict over the limited resources and attention” to determine the 
best institutional arr
     
 the allied state.69 He also enumerates the costs of alliance, including the 
risk of having to aid of the ally, the risk of entrapment in war by the ally, the risk of a 
counter-alliance, foreclosure of alternative alliance options, and the general constraints on 
free action inherent in coordinating policies with allies.70 
In interest-based theories, alliance cohesion depends on how much allies 
share common interests compared with the costs they have to pay. Thus, if they want to 
maintain the alliance, allies try to keep it alive by advancing their own interests within it. 
In Snyder’s view, after the alliance-formation phase, allies may bargain over “levels of 
preparedness, war plans, or the amount of support to be provided in crisis confrontations 
with the adversary, or they may entirely renegotiate the original contract.”71 However, 
one weakness of this interest-based theory is that the interest of a state or alliance is 
measured by material variables, especially ec n
the perspective, allies are supposed 
angements for the future, but both the U.S.-ROK and PRC-DPRK 
alliances lacked such discussions in the 1990s.72 
d. Collective Identity-Based Theory 
Since the late 1980s, constructivists have tried to point out deficiencies in 
realist interpretations of alliance persistence, highlighting instead the role of identity, 
norms or culture in state actions.73 They argue that previous theories focused only on 
material factors, and ignored ideational factors and processes that create the basis of the 
arguments that realists advocate (in fact, most realists believe that ideational variables 
                                            
69  Snyder, Alliance Politics, 43–44. 
70  Ibid. 
71  Snyder, Alliance Politics, 3. 
72  Suh, Power, Interest, and Identity in Military Alliance, 6. 
fic: A 
nal Studies Association 41st Annual Conference, Mar. 14–18, 2000, 
http et.org/isa/nas01/index.html#txt22. 
73  Peter J. Katzenstein, The Culture of National Security: Norms and Identity in World Politics (New 




e PRC’s participation in international institutions between 1980 
and 2000—arg
                                                
may help explain only “deviant cases,” but they “cannot explain non-deviant cases”).74 
From their perspective, ideational structures mediate how actors “perceive, construct, and 
reproduce the institutional and material structures they inhabit,” as well as their own roles 
and identities within them.75 This is because different peoples, groups, and government 
agents can interact intensively and exchange specialized information, corporate identities, 
missions and normative cores inside institutions. For example, Alastair Johnston—who 
studies the pattern of th
ues that “microprocesses of socialization (i.e., mimicking, social influence, 
and persuasion)” within Chinese society helps explain the Chinese attitude and Beijing’s 
policy of “more cooperative and potentially self-constraining commitments” to major 
security institutions.76  
In constructivist analyses of state behavior and relations between states, 
ideational factors and processes are important for tracing “whether collective actors are 
likely to form enmity or amity.”77 Hence, an alliance is formed based on shared identity, 
norms, and cultures, which ultimately promote common interests. In contrast to power-, 
threat-, and interest-based theories that emphasize external material factors in alliance 
formation, constructivists emphasize the meanings and values embedded in those factors. 
From their perspective, even threat perception is socially constructed and reproduced in 
both domestic and international context. In other words, the standard for individuals and 
societies distinguishing between the self and the other—and what constitutes threats to 
the self, and how to respond—determines which factors get priority in threat 
assessments. 78  From this perspective, Peter Katzenstein theorizes that, although the 
balancing of power or threat is somewhat applicable to some Asian countries, realist 
approaches, by disregarding the long legacies of Chinese influence, anti-Japanese enmity, 
 
74  Suh, Katzenstein, and Carlson, Rethinking Security in East Asian: Identity, Power, and Efficiency, 
6; A rinceton, NJ: 
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9. 
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on Univ. Press, 2008), xix. 
75  Ibid., 
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Israeli alliance.82 In contrast, some constructivists, including Wendt and Katzenstein, try 
broader concept of collective identity. They argue that 
collecti
and deep-rooted Confucianism, fail to explain the current situation in the region. 79  
Similarly, David Kang argues that East Asian state alignments are not necessarily 
determined by the material variables realists use to explain European state alignments, 
but are affected also by historical experiences or cultural influences like the long legacy 
of China’s predominance in East Asia.80 In studying PRC-DPRK relations during the 
second half of the twentieth century, You Ji concludes that strong alliance cohesion 
cannot be “built upon shared strategic interest [based on logics of power and threat]” 
alone, but must be “nurtured by common value judgment and social and political 
systems.”81 Michael Barnett attempts to verify the relationships between state identity 
and alliance formation by examining various cases of inter-Arab relations and th
to explain alliances based on the 
ve identity within alliances shapes states’ interests and behavior; thus, the more 
collective identities are shared among allies, the greater the alliance’s cohesion.83 
D. METHODOLOGY  
This research attempts to discover the ideational determinants of cohesion or 
discord, besides power, threat, and self-interest, in the PRC-DPRK and U.S.-ROK 
alliances, beginning, respectively, with the Deng reform era and the ROK’s transition to 
democracy and globalization. This thesis focuses on the changes in collective identities of 
the Chinese and the South Koreans in these periods because the United States and DPRK 
arguably did not undergo major changes in their collective identities, while their allies, 
the PRC and the ROK, experienced significant changes. The United States has 
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hich have been expanding despite their still antagonistic 
relation
direction in alliance cohesion.  
maintained its commitment to defend democracy and free markets in the ROK from the 
DPRK since the outbreak of the Korean War in 1950, while the DPRK retains a 
consistent political, historical, and cultural identity and continues to see its alliance with 
the PRC as necessary for survival in an uncertain regional context. The main hypo
ed in the thesis is that the PRC and the ROK underwent significant changes in 
their collective identities during these periods and that the changes in their collective 
identities led to shifts in the cohesion of their respective alliances with the DPRK and the 
United States. To test this hypothesis, the thesis presents two cases studies, treating the 
changing Chinese and South Korean collective identities as independent variables, and 
the cohesion of the PRC-DPRK, and U.S.-ROK4 alliances as dependent variables. 
Exploring the relationship between collective identity and alliance cohesion is a 
challenging task. This is not only because of the relatively small number of prior research 
studies that have touched on the relevant issues, but also because it is difficult to define 
and measure the concepts that make up the ambiguous variables involved in collective 
identity and alliance cohesion. For this reason, this thesis uses the narrow interpretation 
of alliance as a formal agreement between two or more nation-states that pledge military 
cooperation for security purposes against an actual or anticipated enemy. Similarly,  this 
thesis defines alliance cohesion as the degree to which allies stay together and cooperate 
to defend and promote their common security interests under their mutual obligations and 
commitments, and the thesis measures alliance cohesion mainly by its military aspects. 
These narrow interpretations are necessary because broader definitions are difficult to 
distinguish from current economic relations between the PRC and the ROK, and/or the 
United States and the PRC, w
s in the military field. In addition, it is important to remember that in measuring 
the ideational independent variable (collective identity) and dependent variable (alliance 
cohesion) the aim of the research is not to quantify each variable, but to study the trend of 
qualitative changes in different periods. The goal is to assess whether qualitative changes 
in ideational factors toward greater or lesser-shared identity produce changes in the same 
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ted by official statements or 
politica
                                                
For the purpose of study, this thesis evaluated collective identity by examining the 
PRC’s and the ROK’s political and economic transformations, their roles in and 
commitments to the international community, their nationalism and self-confidence (as 
shown by public polls, mass media commentary, official government publications, and 
statements by political elites, who are the “primary creators and reproducers of a state’s 
collective identity”84).  Simultaneously, the cohesion of each alliance investigated in this 
study is measured by both quantitative and qualitative data in order to overcome the 
limitations in the lack of reliable information about the PRC-DPRK alliance and in 
calculating relative military capability. In other words, there is not enough information 
available about the PRC-DPRK military alliance, so this thesis measures the changes in 
that alliance with information from secondary sources, such as national newspapers, 
government statements, and Chinese and foreign analysts’ comments and predictions. In 
addition, although there is sufficient reliable information about the U.S.-ROK alliance to 
evaluate its cohesion quantitatively, some statistical data used in many previous studies 
are not applicable to current changes in alliance cohesion. For example, changes in the 
absolute number of U.S. military forces in the ROK, which Tenue, Synnestvedt and Ji use 
for measuring alliance cohesion, does not reflect qualitative changes in today’s slimmer 
but powerfully integrated military forces inside and outside the ROK territory. For these 
reasons, alliance cohesion in this thesis is gauged according to three dimensions: (1) the 
level of consensus on military security issues as indica
l support among domestic constituencies for these issues, (2) the frequency, level, 
and nature of military exchanges and assistance, such as arms transfer, military-to-
military contacts, and joint/combined operations, and (3) economic contributions to 
mutual defense security for the U.S.-ROK alliance, as well as the PRC’s food and energy 
aid to the DPRK that could be used for military purposes. 
This thesis contains five chapters. This first chapter has briefly explained the 
research questions and methodology, and defined the two key terms “collective identity” 
and “alliance cohesion,” as the independent and dependent variables of the study. The 
 
84 Anne L. Clunan, The Social Construction of Russia’s Resurgence (Baltimore, MD: John Hopkins 
Univ. Press, 2009), 227. 
 22
s driving changes in the South Korean collective identity through the 
transitions of democratization and globalization, and then analyzes how these changes 
have affected the U.S.-ROK alliance cohesion. Chapter V concludes the thesis by 
verifying the overall causal relationship between the variables and summarizing the 
theoretical and practical implications, as well as policy recommendations for enhancing 
alliance cohesion. 
first chapter has also discussed existing IR explanations of alliances, such as power, 
threat, self-interest, and state identity-based theories, and the research tools used in this 
thesis to measure the variables and reveal the relationships between them. Chapter II 
briefly summarizes realist perspectives on the PRC-DPRK and U.S.-ROK alliances and 
highlights their deficiencies to call attention to the ideational determinant of cohesion in 
the alliances. Chapter III examines changes in Chinese collective identity since Deng’s 
reform era, focusing on their self-perception and their perceptions of others, including the 
United States, ROK, and DPRK. It then assesses the cohesion of the PRC-DPRK alliance 





II. REALIST PERSPECTIVES OF THE PRC-DPRK AND U.S.-
ROK ALLIANCES 
Realists argue that greater imbalances of power and/or threat result in greater 
motives to form and maintain alliances. In Northeast Asia, in particular on the Korean 
peninsula, the imbalance of power between the PRC-DPRK alliance and the U.S.-ROK 









since the end of the Cold War. The realist perspective predicts that the PRC-DP
e will remain as strong as it was during the Cold War era to balance against the 
formidable United States and growing ROK, while the U.S.-ROK alliance will lose its 
original rationale and purpose for the alliance and become weaker. However, this realist 
prediction does not provide a clear explanation for why the cohesion of the two alliances 
does not match their prediction and why Chinese and South Korean perception of threat 
and the enemy have changed independent of the shift of balance of power/threat in the 
region. This chapter discusses realist perspectives on the PRC-DPRK and U.S.-ROK 
alliances and points out their deficiencies, focusing on the impact of changes in Chinese 
and South Korean collective identities on the cohesion of the two alliances.  
A. BALANCE OF POWER IN NORTHEAST ASIA  
To understand the balance of power in East Asia, in particular between the PRC-
DPRK and U.S.-ROK, the military balance in the region should be assessed first.
nce between the PRC-DPRK alliance and the U.S.-ROK alliance. First, data 
presented in Table 1 on military expenditures of the United States, ROK, PRC, and 
DPRK show a huge gap. Although it is believed that the PRC does not release reliable 
rmation about its military spending, and outside estimates are controversial (and th
gap is gradually narrowing as PRC’s economy has grown), the maximum estima
’s military expenditure is still far behind the United States’.  
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Yr 1990 1992 1994 1996 1998 2000 2002 2004 2006 2008 
U.S. 306,170 331,280 296,188 263,727 256,051 342,167 387,297 480,444 511,171 548,531 
ROK 11,666 13,130 13,625 15,481 15,182 16,652 17,605 19,004 21,224 23,773 
PRC 10,800 13,800 12,200 13,700 16,900 23,800 33,400 40,600 52,200 63,600 
DPRK 1,998 2,112 2,220 - 2,000 1,300 1,400 1,790 - - 
Table 1.   Military expenditures of the U.S., ROK, PRC, and DPRK, 1990–2008.85 
For this reason, Chinese government and scholars frequently assert that even after 
the Cold War, Washington’s military expenditures are more than the combined totals of 
eight other major military powers in the world, which is about two times the military 
spending of NATO and over 10 times that of the PRC.86 In addition, the capabilities of 
U.S. forces throughout East Asia have improved, although the number of the U.S. 
military forces in East Asia has decreased since the end of the Cold War. Specifically, 
U.S. military assets in Guam have been upgraded quantitatively and qualitatively, and the 
U.S. military bases there can serve as both strategic and tactical forward bases against the 
PRC. Combat aircraft (e.g., B-1, B-2, and B-52 bombers) as well as naval ships deployed 
to the Guam military bases can reach Taiwan and Japan in two to five hours, and the 
Philippines and the ROK in two to five days.87 The strategic and tactical importance of 
Guam led U.S. Defense Secretary Robert Gates to visit Guam in 2008; he notes that 
Guam’s build-up will be “one of the largest movements of military assets in decades.”88  
 
the ROK Armed Force cantly attenuated, even 
without con
Moreover, the overwhelming numerical superiority of DPRK military forces over
s on the Korean peninsula has been signifi
sidering U.S. forces on the peninsula, by the ROK’s advanced military 
                                                 
85 Figures from 1990–1998 are in million of US dollars at constant 1995 prices and exchange rates, 
and figures from 1999–2008 are in million of US dollars at constant 2005 prices and exchange rates. 
Sources are the SIPRI Yearbook 2000, 2009; The Military Balance 1997/1998, 2000, 2004, 2008. 
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88 Ibid., 1. 
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g Hamm has analyzed the dynamics of military balance between the two 
Koreas
technology—in particular, air and naval power, mobility, C4ISR, logistics—and its 
economic growth throughout the 1990s and 2000s. In fact, although the force-to-force 
ratios on the Korean peninsula between the DPRK and the ROK as of 2006 is almost 3 to 
1, the balance between the two countries in terms of weighted effectiveness index (WEI) 
/weighted unit value (WUI)—which considers capabilities of firepower, mobility, and 
survivability of weapons—is only 1.4 to 1 and continues to decrease significantly.89  
Taik-youn
 in terms of the “military capital stocks (i.e., the depreciated cumulative spending 
on defense)” from the Korean War period to the early 2000s (see Figure 1).  
 
 
 Military expenditures ofFigure 1.   the ROK and DPRK; military spending for arms 
import of the ROK and DPRK.90 
 
n the two 
He says that it is the conventional wisdom that the DPRK maintains military
superiority over the ROK because “bean counts” of the military balance betwee
                                                 
89 Suh, Power, Interest, and Identity in Military Alliance, 32–36. 
90 Units are U.S. dollars in millions. “DPRK 1, 2, 3” are DPRK military spending measured by 
different institutions, including RAND (DPRK 1), Dr. Lee Sangwoo (DPRK 2), and ROK Ministry of 
National Defense (DPRK 3). “ROK” and “DPRK” are assessed by Hamm. Taik-young Hamm, 
Bukhangunsamunjaewi Jaejomyong [Reevaluation of North Korea’s Military Affairs] (Seoul, ROK: 
Hanwool, 2006), 363. 
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Koreas have critical flaws, arguing that ROK defense expenditures have surpassed the 
DPRK since 1979 and its conventional military power caught up with the DPRK in the 
early 1980s. 91 In fact, by 2005, the ROK annual defense budget was larger than the 
entire DPRK economy, while ROK’s spending on force improvement plans alone was 
larger than the total DPRK defense budget.92 This means that, if one factors in the U.S. 
forces on the peninsula, the overall military balance is more favorable to the U.S.-ROK 
alliance.  
Second, the U.S. military presence in the region, foreign military sales (FMS), 
and high technology arms transfers to its allies (Japan, the ROK, Taiwan, the Philippines, 
and Australia) and new partners (India and some Central Asian countries) have increased 
Chinese fears of U.S. containment policy against them. The future use of U.S. military 
 
modernization—such as
                                                
power to maintain dominance over the region and plans for military procurement and
 strategic flexibility, forward operating military bases, and global 
strike programs shown in the Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) and Global Posture 
Review (GPR)—have increased the Chinese threat perception of the United States and its 
allies.93 While the total amount of the U.S. FMS to its East Asian allies declined rapidly 
in 1993 due to the demise of Cold War sentiment and subsequent changes in the security 
environment, the decline was only temporary. In fact, the U.S. FMS to the region was 
relatively higher than to any other region in the 1990s, and increased in 2002, 2006, and 
2007, as shown in Figure 2. In addition, the United States has granted Japan and the ROK 
the privilege status for purchasing U.S. defense goods under relatively less restrictions, so 
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 Figure 2.   U.S. Foreign Military Sales (FMS) agreement to major East Asian allies.95 
st Asia.   
On the other hand, in assessing the threats to a unified Korea in the near future, 
the ROK’s middle- and long-term military planners have considered not only the explicit 
thre he 
Although the U.S. FMS to Taiwan were the most significantly reduced among the 
allies in East Asia, Washington’s strategic decision in 2001 to offer huge, and 
qualitatively advanced arms sales to Taiwan was an enormous shock to Beijing, not only 
because of the size of the arms package (over U.S. $20 billion), but also because of the 
items in the package, including eight diesel-electric submarines, twelve P-3C anti-
submarine patrol aircrafts, thirty anti-tank helicopters (such as AH-64D Apache and AH-
17 Cobra), and the most capable U.S. missile defense system, PAC-3.96 Moreover, the 
Chinese perceive that Washington’s attempt to establish missile defense systems with 
U.S. allies close to the PRC and the DPRK is intended to weaken the PRC’s nuclear 
deterrence capabilities, and thus increases the imbalance of military power between the 
superpower and the rising powers in Ea
at from the North, but also potential threats from neighbors beyond the theater of t
                                                 
95 The author created the figure, based on the data from U.S. Department of Defense Security 
Cooperation Agency, “Foreign Military Sales, Foreign Military Construction Sales and Other Security 
Cooperation Historical Facts (as of September 30, 2007),” http://www.dsca.mil (accessed July 30, 2009). 
. 
96 Michael S. Chase, “Taiwan’s Arms Procurement Debate and the Demise of the Special Budget 




B. DEGREE OF PERCEIVED EXTERNAL THREAT 
 
s—near 
the Korean peninsula and the Strait.   
 peninsula, such as the PRC and Japan. This thrust has been reflected in the 
ROK’s military modernization programs since the mid-1990s. Its future force 
improvement programs, shown in Defense Reform 2020 (behind schedule due to budget 
shortfalls), include advanced C4ISR, unmanned aerial surveillance vehicles, cruise 
missiles, space programs, long-range strike capabilities, a blue-water navy, naval air-
defense (AEGIS system) capabilities, nuclear-powered submarines, and strategically 
placed naval bases.97 Although the ROK has never officially addressed the potential 
threat from the PRC, many Korean experts and military analysts believe that the ROK’s 
military modernization programs are driven by the South Korean desire to be a mid-level 
power and prepared for any potential conflict with the PRC or Japan.   
Threat-based theories of alliances would predict that since the end of the Cold
War, the PRC-DPRK alliance faces a new threat which it needs to balance (i.e., the U.S.-
ROK/Japan alliances). From Beijing’s perspective, the presence of U.S. forces in the 
ROK and Japan and the U.S. commitment to Taiwan pose an immense threat to the PRC 
and DPRK. Realists have highlighted a number of primary sources of U.S. threat to the 
PRC. First, during the two DPRK nuclear crises in 1994 and 2003 and the Taiwan Strait 
crisis in 1995-1996, Beijing was very anxious about Washington’s preparation for a 
military strike to destroy the DPRK’s nuclear facilities, which became the central security 
concern of the PRC. 98  In these crises, Washington deployed air and naval assets—
including two aircraft carriers, nuclear submarines, B-1 and B-52 bombers, and F-117 
stealth fighters on alert for deployment, as well as various surveillance platform
99
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u III-class frigate and reconnaissance plane in March 2001.100 More recently, 
in March 2009, the PLA sent Y-12 maritime surveillance aircraft, a frigate and a couple 
of patrol ships, as well as fishery patrol ships to monitor two U.S. ocean surveillance 
ships, the USNS Victorious and USNA Impeccable.101 
Third, the May 7, 1999 bombing of the PRC embassy and the Chinese collateral 
damage (three Chinese diplomats killed and 20 injured) in Belgrade, Yugoslavia by U.S.-
led NATO forces, despite President Clinton’s “immediate and profuse” apology, caused 
Chinese anger at the United States to boil over and increased U.S. threat perceptions and 
anti-American sentiment in the PRC. Beijing allowed the Chinese protesters to violently 
attack U.S. diplomatic facilities and American restaurants in the PRC and cancelled all 
scheduled diplomatic meetings with the United States for the rest of the year.102 This 
kind of anti-American sentiment and their threat perception of U.S. containment policy 
against the PRC became more severe a couple of weeks after the bombing incident, when 
Options for the Asian-Pacific Region” and argued that this option could be transferred to 
“key U
Second, Beijing was very concerned about U.S. intelligence and surveillance 
activities in the PRC territories, and frequently criticized them as provocative actions. 
Even before the 2001 EP-3 incident, there were many cases when Beijing sent PLA Navy 
ships and Air Force aircraft to search and intercept U.S. surveillance ships, aircraft, and 
even carrier groups, and expelled U.S. diplomats from the PRC after accusing them of 
collecting military intelligence. For instance, the USS Bowditch, a U.S. surveillance ship 
operating in the Yellow Sea (the West Sea of the ROK), was closely tracked by a PLA 
Navy Jiangh
U.S. Secretary of Defense Cohen introduced “Theater Missile Defense Architecture 
.S. allies,” including Japan, the ROK, and Taiwan.103  
On the other hand, threat-based theories argue that the U.S.-ROK alliance has 
become weaker since the post-Cold War, even though the presence of highly militarized 
North Korean forces near the DMZ continues to be perceived as a major threat to the 
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4 and 2002-2005, DPRK’s 
submarine infiltration in 1998, and naval clashes on the Yellow Sea in 1999 and 2002. 
K alliance has faced lessening perceived threat from the 
declinin
ROK. A number of provocative actions by the DPRK temporary increased tension in the 
Korean peninsula, such as DPRK’s nuclear crises in 1993-199
This is because the U.S.-RO
g DPRK in terms of its economy, political stability, conventional military 
capabilities, and even its nuclear capabilities. The United States has enjoyed hegemonic 
power in the region and the power of the ROK has significantly improved and surpassed 
the North.  
 
 
ure 3.   Numbers of DPRK terrorist incidents and violations of armistice treaty.104 
Threat-based realists highlight the fact that the numbers of the armistice 
agreement violations and support for terrorist incidents by the DPRK have gradually 
declined since the 1980s, as shown in Figure 3. They argue that those provocative actions 
could not change the imbalance of power and/or threat between the ROK (U.S.-ROK 
Fig
alliance) and DPRK (PRC-DPRK alliance). As a result, during Kim Dae-jung and Roh 
                                                 
104 Yongho Kim, “North Korea: A Perpetual Rogue State?” in John Ikenberry and Chung-In Moon eds, 
The United States and Northeast Asia: Debate, Issues, and New Order (Lanham, MD: Rowman and 
Littlefield Publishers, Inc., 2008), 151. 
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ion and 
international support. The PRC-DPRK alliance has attempted to increase its power in 
order to deter or defeat the U.S.-ROK alliance. For this reason, realists believe that 
Beijing would accept Pyongyang and its material capabilities, including nuclear weapons 
and ballistic missiles (weapons of mass destruction, or WMDs), as an effective tool to 
balance against the U.S.-led alliances in North East Asia.106 At the same time, realists 
argue that the United States and ROK will lose their shared rationale for the alliance (i.e., 
ROK’s defense against North Korean aggression) and thus become weaker than during 
the Cold War era.  
However, these realist views do not provide a convincing explanation for why the 
PRC-DPRK alliance has actually weakened since the end of the Cold War era in the face 
of greater threats from the United States and ROK. Nor do these theories explain why the 
actual U.S.-ROK alliance cohesion has become stronger than it was during the Cold War. 
In addition, few realists have attempted to study the reasons that Chinese and South 
Korean public attitudes toward threat and enemy have changed independently of the shift 
in the balance of power/threat in the region. For instance, the majority of the South 
Korean public no longer see DPRK’s nuclear capability as a direct threat to themselves, 
                                                
Moo-hyun’s administrations, Seoul changed its view of the DPRK from a major source of 
threat to a “long-lost brother in need of ROK’s assistance.”105 
C. CONCLUSION 
To summarize, realists argue that in Northeast Asia, especially in the Korean 
peninsula, the imbalance of power/threat between the PRC-DPRK alliance and the U.S.-
ROK alliance and the level of perceived threat to the PRC and DPRK has grown. This 
suggests that the PRC-DPRK alliance will remain as strong as it was during the Cold War 
to balance against the formidable power and growing threat of the U.S.-ROK alliance, 
with its superior military technology, economy, resources for mobilizat
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and K 
Defense White Paper at a time when the DPRK’s second nuclear crisis was a hot 
interna
 the characterization of the DPRK as “the main threat” was removed from the RO
tional issue. Furthermore, balance of power/threat logic still has some limitations 
in explaining why many Chinese analysts doubt if Beijing’s military obligation could be 
fulfilled in case of war on the Korean peninsula, and why Washington and Seoul have 
sought to transform their alliance from the singularly focused mission of defending the 
ROK against the DPRK to a more robust values-based one that looks beyond the Korean 
peninsula. The following chapters focus on ideational factors influencing the Chinese and 
South Korean leadership and public and explain how these factors have changed 




singly attempted to counter the “China threat” perception, accepted the values 
and no
reat Power” Mentality 
Deng’s reform and subsequent economic growth are the most significant 
indigenous factors that have instilled self-confidence into China’s identity. The Chinese 
peo of 
 
                                                
III. CHINESE IDENTITY AND THE PRC-DPRK ALLIANCE 
With the powerful momentum of Deng’s reform policy that coincided with the 
end of the Cold War, China has faced rapid economic development, the need for political 
transformation, and subsequent changes in Chinese identity. As the PRC’s economy has 
grown and the quality of life in the PRC has improved, the Chinese people have become 
confident, leaving behind their long legacy of a “victim mentality (shouhaizhe 
xintai),”107 and have embraced the PRC’s new international status as a regional and 
global “responsible great power.” These evolving ideational changes have been continued 
by Deng’s successors and the new Chinese generations, who apply pragmatic standards 
to themselves, their allies and their enemies. Simultaneously, the Chinese people have 
begun to consider not only their self-image but also other’s perceptions of them. In order 
to convince its neighbors that the PRC is a “benign and peaceful rising power,” the PRC 
has increa
rms of the international system, and acted in support of existing international 
arrangements. 108  This section explains the main factors that have shaken up the 
traditional characteristics of Chinese collective identity, and analyzes how changes in 
Chinese self-perception and their perceptions of others, including its traditional ally, the 
DPRK, have impacted the Chinese view of the Sino-DPRK alliance and shifted Beijing’s 
policy with regard to Pyongyang.   
A. CHINESE “SELF-PERCEPTION” 
1. Growing Self-Confidence and “Responsible G
ple, having experienced rapid economic growth and improvement in their quality 
life, are now the most optimistic people in the world. Growing Chinese self-confidence is
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the perceived success of the PRC’s economic and social development over the past two 
decades. 
Diplomatically and socially, a century-old Chinese “victim mentality,” based on 
humiliation originating with the Western powers’ colonization of Chinese territory in the 
nineteenth century, is slowly disappearing.  During Mao’s era, Chinese schoolchildren 
were taught about “China’s century of humiliation” and Chinese politicians frequently 
used the term to provoke nationalistic public sentiment. However, in the past 10 years, 
Chinese politicians and mass media have used the term “century of humiliation” much 
less than during Mao’s era.112 For this reason, Evan Medeiros and M. Taylor Fravel argue 
that for over a decade, the PRC has exhibited a “stark departure” from the tradition of 
Chinese passivity and isolation and the “victim mentality.”113  
                                                
d in various aspects of Chinese collective identity. Politically and economically, 
as China’s economy has grown since the early 1980s, more Chinese people have 
indicated satisfaction with Deng’s reform and the Chinese political and economic models. 
The Hoover Institution’s 1999 survey of six Chinese cities found that the greatest number 
of the Chinese respondents choose their political system as the best model.109 According 
to the Pew Global Attitude Project’s 47-nation survey from 2002 to 2007, the PRC had 
the most optimistic prospects for the next generation. A full 84 percent of Chinese 
people—compared to 30 percent of Americans, 17 percent of the French, and 10 percent 
of the Japanese—say that when their country’s children grow up, they will be better off 
than people are today.110 Furthermore, 83 percent of Chinese people express satisfaction 
with the national condition in 2007, up from 48 percent in the 2002 survey and the 
biggest increase among the 47 nations studied.111 This sense of satisfaction derives f
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On the other hand, ever since the term “responsible major power” was first used 
by PRC’s Foreign Minister Qian Qichen in 1992, many Chinese scholars and politicians 
have openly discussed what roles a responsible major power should play to “self-
confidently” transform the PRC and the Chinese away from their tragic history of 
victimization.114 As a result, the meaning of “responsibility” in the eyes of the Chinese 
leadership and people has changed over time. The term, which meant “responsibility to 
support and promote international struggles” in Mao’s revolutionary era, now means the 
responsibility of a world power, which implies active and constructive participation in 
multilateral institutions, supporting international laws and norms, and contributing to 
regional and world “peace and development.”115 Figure 4 shows that references to the 
PRC’s self-categorization, or emergent identity, as a “responsible major power” in 
official statements and media by Chinese leaders and scholars has increased rapidly. 
 
 Frequency of articles using the term “responsible major power” in the 
People’s Daily and in Chinese academic articles, 1994–2004.
Figure 4.  
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ave declined in most non-
African
                                                
 The more the Chinese people are exposed to the new norm of a free market and to 
regional and international communities, the more they consider not only awareness of 
themselves, their governance, and their state, but also other’s perception of themselves.  
In addition, the more the PRC pursues economic prosperity, the greater its commitment 
to securing the norms of free trade, capital flow, and transparency. At present, Chinese 
political and economic elites are well aware that reliable economic growth cannot be 
sustained without interaction with other regional and international actors with a wary eye 
on the PRC’s rapid economic and military growth. Specifically, the majority of Japanese, 
South Koreans, Taiwanese, and Americans see the PRC’s rapid military and economic 
growth as a potential threat. The 2007 Pew Global Attitude Project’s 47-nation survey 
indicates that overall assessment of the rise of the PRC h
 countries since 2002, due to growing concerns with the PRC’s military 
modernization that attenuate positive perspectives on the PRC’s economic growth.117 For 
this reason, Beijing has worked hard since the 1990s to counter the “Chinese threat” 
perception prevailing among its neighbors and sought to build its reputation as a “good 
global citizen and regional neighbor.”118  
2. The Public’s Greater Awareness 
China’s growing self-confidence has played a significant role in increasing 
Chinese nationalism and public activism in domestic and international affairs, 
encouraging the Chinese public to raise political, historical, and even economic demands 
in the name of patriotism.119 For the CCP, it is hard to be free of nationalistic public 
demands when making foreign policy, because patriotism or nationalism is a major 
ideological factor that the CCP has encouraged to consolidate its regime legitimacy. For 
this reason, Yinan He argues that patriotism or nationalism has gradually replaced 
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 foreign policy. Unlike the Chinese public under 
Mao’s rule, today’s Chinese public is exposed to better and more varied sources of 
information through the Internet, newspapers and magazines. With these information 
sources, the Chinese people are more aware and more engaged in domestic and 
international affairs.121 For instance, according to the 1999 Six-Chinese Cities survey 
conducted by the Hoover Institution, 43 percent of respondents disagree with the idea that 
the government should decide whether an idea or a theory can be published, and 54 
percent say the government should not constrain political dissent.122  
Although the PRC’s authoritarian political system exercises strong censorship 
over its people, Chinese officials and politicians have gradually realized that the state and 
party cannot completely control, monitor, or distort all the information, ideas and 
opinions available in the media, and in particular the Internet. For instance, the 1999 
Belgrade Embassy bombing, the 2001 U.S. EP-3 incident, the spread of SARS epidemic 
9 are 
good examples of how fast and profoundly Chinese “netizens” can share information 
about sensitive political and di
communism as the “ideological foundation of the CCP’s regime legitimacy.” 120  
Although the PRC’s leadership and politicians are less susceptible to public opinion than 
their counterparts in democracies, the Chinese public has become more capable of 
influencing Beijing’s domestic and
in south China in 2003, and the Uighur-Han Chinese ethnic conflict in 2008 and 200  
plomatic issues using discussion groups such as bulletin 
board systems (BBS) and instant messages.  It is increasingly difficult for the 30,000 
Chinese cyber-cops to monitor and block such messages. In addition to the Internet, the 
number of newspapers and magazines published in the PRC has increased dramatically, 
from under a hundred government- and CCP-run newspapers in 1979, to approximately 
2,000 newspapers, 9,000 magazines, 273 radio stations and 352 TV stations in 2007 (see 
Figure 5). 123  Susan Shirk describes the newly commercialized Chinese media and 
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Internet and the growing population of the Chinese netizens as a “media revolution,” 
arguing that the media revolution has spread rapidly and widely, loosened the CCP’s 
censorship, and “radically transformed domestic politics and complicated the domestic 






igure 5.   The PRC’s Media Growth in Comparative Perspective, 1985–2002.125 
3. The Public’s Louder Voice and Activism in Politics 
There has been growing public discussion of domestic and global affairs and these 
have influenced Beijing’s policymaking process. Open debates on sensitive issues, such 
as human rights, democracy, nonproliferation, and missile defense, were unheard of even 
years ago. Today, Chinese intellectuals and the official media have engaged all these
issues in nationwide TV talk shows, books, and websites, seeking to influence and sh
Beijing’s policy.126 Meanwhile, many cases demonstrate how the Chinese public uses the
Internet and web-based petitions to share prohibited information, coordinate online-
movements, and organize street protests. Although many of these cases have not changed 
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greater attention from the central 
govern
and anti-American protest on Chinese websites, the case of Sun Zhigang and the “BMW 
inciden
PRC domestic policy, they have successfully attracted 
ment and from party and local officials. For instance, in addition to anti-Japanese 
t” illustrate how the Chinese people have created much louder public voices using 
the Internet and have criticized corrupt government officials and major domestic policies, 
including the migrant permit system and judicial system.127 Currently, Chinese netizens 
use a strategy called the “Internet manhunt” to gather information on corrupt officials’ 
misconduct and activities. This information is posted to websites in order to protect 
people’s rights, and the netizens have frequently called on the CCP to prosecute these 
corrupt officials.128 In addition, Chinese netizens have criticized the “Green Dam,” a new 
government policy that prevents children from accessing pornographic and other harmful 
Internet content. Critics claim that the policy is aimed at consolidating the central 
government’s heavy censorship of the Internet. On July 1, 2009, Beijing postponed the 
installation of the Green Dam software in response to growing criticism by both Chinese 
netizens and Western governments and corporations.129  
As the PRC’s economy has grown, the mostly middle class and college educated 
netizen-base has also expanded. One of the greatest risks to the CCP is political 
instability that might be amplified by netizens interested in various social issues, 
including unemployment, social inequality between the rich and poor and between urban 
(coastal) and rural (hinterland) areas, fraud and corruption, the democratic movement, 
nationalism, ethnic unrest, environmental degradation, and public health issues.130  
                                                 
127 The S
beaten to death
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B. 
i  countries to continue 
their ed
                                                
CHINESE PERCEPTIONS OF “OTHERS” 
1. Chinese Pro-Western Attitudes and Increasing Involvement in 
International Institutions 
The more Chinese people become satisfied and confident in their own political 
and economic systems, the more open-minded they become to Western ideologies and 
systems. The 2001–2008 Pew Global Attitude Project’s global public opinion survey 
shows that 89 percent of the Chinese have strong enthusiasm for globalization, compared 
to 53 percent of Americans and 71 percent of the Japanese, and more than a half of the 
Chinese respondents have a positive view of U.S. culture, technology, and ideas.131 Since 
the early 1980s, the Beijing looked for a new model from foreign countries, one with a 
greater emphasis on efficiency, individualism, pragmatism and global standards. The 
more Chinese students and scholars leave for developed fore gn
ucation, the more foreign-educated “returnees” will join the numerous official and 
private think-tanks in the PRC that have played a crucial role in shaping public discourse 
and Beijing’s foreign policy. 132  According to Xinhua, a PRC state news agency, 
1,360,000 Chinese nationals have studied abroad in the past three decades (approximately 
37 percent in the United States). Some 370,000 foreign-educated Chinese students and 
scholars had returned to the PRC by the end of 2008.133 Of the upcoming generation 
“Fifth Generation” of PRC leaders who will replace Hu Jintao’s ruling group in 2012, 
16.5 percent (i.e., 17 leaders) had undertaken foreign study in the United States, Japan, 
and other Western countries.134 A significant fact is that the better-educated people are, 
either in the PRC or in foreign countries, the more a pro-Western culture and institutions 
develop.135 
 
131 The Pew Global Attitudes Project, “Global Public Opinion in the Bush Years (2001–2008),” 9; 




132 Cheng Li, “China’s New Think Tank: Where Officials, Entrepreneurs, and Scholars Interact,” 
China Leadership Monitor No. 29 (Summer 2009), 
http://www.brookings.e
ust 15, 2009), 3–6. 
133 Ibid., 15. 
134 Li, “China’s Lost Generation,” 106. 
135 Tang, Public Opinion and Political Change in China
 42
of others, and especially of 
Western powers and their institutions, have changed from antagonistic to moderate and 
even friendly. For example, the PRC’s membership in international institutions and 
organizations increased steadily and dramatically since the beginning of Deng’s reform 
era. In addition, the PRC’s membership in international non-government organizations 
(INGOs) also has increased steadily, from 71 in 1977 to 403 in 1986, 1,136 in 1997, and 
1,275 in 2000.136 Figure 6 and Table 2 illustrate that the PRC became progressively more 
involved in international organizations, including arms control regimes, and particularly 
after the death of Mao in 1979.  The amount of PRC official rhetoric about “hegemony” 
is remarkably reduced since Deng’s era (except for periods immediately after the 1999 
Belgrade Embassy bombing and the 2001 U.S. EP-3 incident).137  
The PRC also joined the Asian Development Bank (ADB) and applied for 
membership in the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) and the World 
C s 
(NPT) and the Nuclear Suppliers G  by the Chemical Weapons 
onvention (CWC) in 1993 and the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) in 1996.138 
urthermore, Beijing has reached bilateral agreements with Washington pledging 
dherence to the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR) guidelines. Alastair 
hnston, in examining Chinese perceptions of international institutions, concludes that 
creasing participation by Beijing in international arms control institutions established 
n a “non-realpolitik, and even anti-realpolitik ideology” beginning in the early 1980s 
                                              
With increasing interaction since the 1980s between Chinese and Westerners in 
bilateral and multilateral institutions, Chinese perceptions 
Trade Organization (WTO) in 1989. Beijing joined the Asian-Pacific Economic 
ooperation (APEC) and signed the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapon
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rove that the PRC has become “more cooperative and [has made] potentially self-
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Name of Treaty Accession Signature Ratification 
Geneva Protocol - 1952 1952 
Latin America Nuclear Weapons-Free Zone - 1973 1974* 
Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons (CCCW) - 1981 1982 
Antarctic Treaty 1983 - - 
Outer Space Treaty - 1983 1983 
Biological Weapons Convention - 1984 1984 
Convention on Assistance in Case of Nuclear Accident 1986 - - 
Convention on Early Notification of Nuclear Accident 1986 - - 
South Pacific Nuclear Weapons-Free Zone - 1987 1998* 
IAEA Application of Safeguard in the PRC - 1988 1989 
Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material 1989 - - 
Seabed Treaty 1991 - - 
Non-Proliferation Treaty 1992 - - 
Chemical Weapons Convention - 1993 1997* 
Convention on Nuclear Safety - 1994 1996 
London Convention on Nuclear Dumping 1994 - - 
CCCW Protocol II (landmines) and Protocol IV (lasers) - 1996 1998* 
Africa Nuclear Weapons-Free Zone - 1996 1997* 
Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) - 1996 - 
Southeast Asia Nuclear Weapons-Free Zone - 1999 - 
Table 2.   The PRC’s arms control treaty accessions, signature, and ratification.141 
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rnational community and to stop threatening regional stability. 
Nevertheless, the DPRK’s response was much more aggressive, threatening the ROK 
with a
visit to Pyongyang by a PRC president since Beijing normalized relations with Seoul in 
2. Chinese Perceptions of the DPRK 
Unlike Mao, who shared revolutionary and ideological values with Kim Il Sung 
and his army from the Japanese colonial era to the Cold War era, Deng and his successors 
have undertaken pragmatic and reformative policies and increasingly respected the values 
and norms of the international institutions that Beijing has been involv  in. A majority 
of the Chinese now believe that their nation is transforming from a weak, developing 
country to a regionally and globally responsible power.142 As a responsible great power, 
Beijing has begun to express clear disdain for illegal and irrational practices of foreign 
countries and has worked proactively with the international community since the late 
1990s to defeat terrorism, the illegal drug trade, and the production of counterfeit U.S. 
and PRC currency.  
Despite its traditional relationship of alliance with the DPRK, Beijing has come to 
oppose allowing Pyongyang to act freely in violation of the norms and rules of the 
international community. For instance, Beijing condemned the DPRK’s interest in 
terrorism, including the 1983 Rangoon bombing that killed 21 ROK officials, including 
four Cabinet members, and the 1987 explosion of a Korean civil airliner that killed all 
115 passengers.143 Although Beijing undertook passive measures and also prepared to 
support the DPRK in case of attack by the United States during the first DPRK nuclear 
crisis in 1994, it did seek to maintain stability in the region and urged Pyongyang to 
cooperate with the inte
 harsh rhetoric of “Bulbada (sea of fire)” in Seoul. Escalated tensions with 
Washington, Seoul, and Japan  aroused Beijing’s concern.144  
Despite Jiang Zemin’s successful visit to the DPRK in 2001—the first official 
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t North 
Korea.]”148   
A number of signs indicate significant changes in the perception of Pyongyang 
nounced that it supports Pyongyang, “Beijing’s 
port” is no longer “unconditional,” as it was during the Cold War era, but only 
     
1992—the DPRK’s second nuclear crisis in 2002 badly damaged the PRC’s interests and 
reputation again. This contributed to the increasingly negative image of the DPRK in 
Chinese minds. In particular, Beijing has been furious with Pyongyang’s public disregard 
of Beijing’s “wishes and advices” since the early 2000s and its continuing provocative 
behavior and rhetoric toward the United States and South Korea. 145  Almost every 
Chinese person took great national pride in China’s playing an “unprecedented leadership 
role in the historic event” of the Six-Party Talks begun in August 2003 to resolve a 
controversial regional security issue.  Pyongyang’s embarrassing and distrustful behavior 
both inside and outside the Six-Party Talks has frequently damaged Beijing’s leadership 
role and disappointed international expectations of Beijing. 146  Despite significant 
achievements from the “September 2005 Joint Statement of Principle” and the “February 
2007 Agreement” of the Six-Party Talks, the DPRK’s detonation of a nuclear device in 
October 2006 and its second nuclear test in May 2009 seriously damaged the situation. 
After the DPRK nuclear test, Beijing immediately criticized Kim Jong-il, using the term 
“brazen” which it has only used five times in the past, and against the United States, 
Japan, and Taiwan. 147  Former U.S. Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice called this 
response to the DPRK’s nuclear test a “significant turn” of its policy toward the DPRK 
and stated “I cannot conceive of even a short time ago China agreeing to call North 
Korea’s behavior a threat to international peace and security…and I think it’s very 
unusual and quite significant that China has decided to [support sanctions agains
and Sino-DPRK ties at all levels of Chinese government and society. At the government 
levels, although Beijing has officially an
sup
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“condit
 academic journals from publicly raising doubts about  DPRK policy.154 
ional.” 149  Many Chinese officials recall that Pyongyang frustrated Beijing by 
siding with the Soviet Union during the Sino-Soviet conflict in the 1960s and 1970s, and 
threatened Beijing by establishing contact with Taipei and making a deal to take waste 
from Taiwan’s nuclear power program in response to Beijing’s recognition of Seoul and 
its rejection of aid to Pyongyang in the 1990s. After a series of such incidents between 
the two countries, Chinese officials and think-tanks mentioned indirectly that the main 
source of instability on the peninsula would come not from the United States, the ROK, 
or Japan, but from its traditional ally, the DPRK, which has greater chances of a political 
coup, economic collapse, missile test, development of nuclear weapons, and social 
unrest.150 Even Jiang Zemin, who visited Pyongyang to restore Sino-DPRK relations and 
revitalize the DPRK’s economy in 2001, said in his Crawford, Texas summit with 
President Bush in 2002 that he did not know if Kim Jong-il was a peaceful man.151 
Similarly, Hu Jintao told U.S. officials in private meetings in 2005 that he was impatient 
with Kim Jong-il and frustrated with the DPRK’s self-defeating policies.152 Moreover, 
after the DPRK’s second nuclear test in May 2009, the PRC Ministry of Foreign Affairs 
spokesman referred the DPRK as a mere “neighbor” and Sino-DPRK ties as “normal 
relations between states.” 153  The PRC’s state-run media have cautiously begun to 
criticize the DPRK’s behavior as “irrational” and intended to increase tension in the 
region.  Alternative policies are sometimes proposed, although Beijing still restricts the 
private press and
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 DPRK as a “nuclear state” to foreign and domestic 
media like Reuters, CCTV, China Daily, and Global Times. These scholars say that the 
DPRK’s opaque intentions and ns, are not merely 
a poke
in their economic and social achievements, China’s younger generation has adopted a 
of o ker in 
     
At the intellectual level, many liberal Chinese scholars have frequently suggested 
that Beijing take tougher measures, such as cutting aid to and trade with the DPRK, 
abrogating the mutual defense treaty (as Russia did in the mid-1990s), and enhancing 
relationships and military ties with Washington, Seoul and Japan.155 They argue that the 
PRC should no longer side with internationally recognized bad regimes, such as Kim 
Jong-il’s, because the international community is watching and assessing its leading role 
as a responsible great power. In 2009, the “year of the Sino-DPRK friendship,” many 
influential Chinese scholars, including Zhang Liangui at the Central Party School, Sun 
Zhe at Tsinghua University, and Zhan Debin at Fudan University, began to publicly 
express their new perceptions of the
capabilities, including its nuclear weapo
 in the eye to the United States, the ROK, or Japan.  The DPRK also places 
economic, diplomatic, and military burdens on Beijing to such extent that it will become 
a “grave national security threat” to the PRC, and particularly to the northeastern 
industrialized Chinese provinces.156 A survey of 20 top Chinese foreign policy experts 
conducted by the state-run Global Times after the DPRK’s nuclear test in May 2009 
shows that exactly half of the Chinese experts supported Beijing’s involvement in harsher 
UN sanctions against the DPRK, reflecting a great shift in Chinese expert perception of 
the DPRK.157   
Changes in Chinese perceptions of the DPRK are found not only among political 
and economic elite groups, but also in common public opinion. As the Chinese gain pride 
more pragmatic and nationalistic, less ideological and historical standard in its perception 
ther countries. From the young people’s perspective, the DPRK is a trouble-ma
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gyang, do not want to become involved 
again in
and more than 30,000 South Koreans were studying in the PRC as of 2003, while 53,000 
Chinese live in the ROK as of 2005.  The Sino-ROK relationship was upgraded from a 
the region.158 For instance, when asked if they were interested in visiting the DPRK, most 
Chinese college students answered “No.”159 In addition, the rapidly growing number of 
young, vocal Chinese netizens also clearly follows the trend of being anti-Kim Jong-il 
with criticism and personal opinions posted on chat rooms, blogs, instant messages and 
bulletin boards. After informal conversations about the DPRK with numerous middle and 
lower-level Chinese officials, scholars, journalists, businessmen and common people, 
Russian experts conclude that many Chinese do not expect a bright future for Kim Jong-
il’s regime, no longer feel a commitment to Pyon
 any conflict on the Korean peninsula, and do not consider the DPRK as a brother 
to be supported unconditionally.160  
3. Chinese Perceptions of the United States and ROK 
In contrast to its decreasing emphasis on relations with the DPRK, Beijing has put 
a greater value on its fast-growing economic, political, and military ties with the United 
States and the ROK, showing clearly that it no longer regards them as enemies. Since 
Beijing’s recognition of Washington in 1979 and of Seoul in 1992, Sino-American and 
Sino-ROK ties have improved remarkably in literally every respect, including military-
to-military contacts. Sino-DPRK ties, meanwhile, have become more complicated, with 
decreasing Chinese commitment to Pyongyang. In addition to the remarkable growth of 
the PRC-ROK economic relationship, more than 200,000 South Koreans live in the PRC, 
161
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y, 
more Chinese people (31 percent) have an unfavorable view of the DPRK, while only 18 
force deployments, as long as it provides regional stability, helps prevent arms races, and 
keep K  behavior.167 
“cooperative partnership” to a “comprehensive cooperative partnership” in July 2003, 
and to a “strategic cooperative partnership” in 2008. 162  For this reason, Sino-ROK 
relations are regarded as among the most successful cases of PRC engagement, and many 
China experts argue that the PRC is now at the “breaking point” with the DPRK.163 This 
change in Chinese perspectives on the two Koreas is also reflected in Chinese public 
opinion polls. According to the 2006 Pew Global Attitude Project’s 6-nation surve
percent have a negative view over the ROK.164   
On the other hand, Chinese attitudes toward the world’s dominant power, the 
United States, have also become moderate, although the majority of Chinese still consider 
the United States as the greatest threat to themselves. According to the 1999 Hoover 
Institution survey, Chinese respondents picked the U.S. and Japan’s economic models as 
the first (40 percent) and second (29 percent) best models in the world, and choose the 
U.S. political model as the second best model, after to China’s own political system.165 
The Pew Global Attitude Project’s 2007 public opinion survey also indicates that 44 
percent of the Chinese believe that the United States, like the PRC, considers the interests 
of other nations when setting its foreign policy, while only 24 percent of the British and 
35 percent of the Japanese agree.166 Most of the time Chinese security thinkers and 
decision-makers are satisfied with U.S. policy toward the Korean peninsula, including 
im Jong-il from provocative and aggressive
In sum, the PRC faced a series of major domestic and international changes in the 
1980s and 1990s. These changes affected the PRC’s collective identity. The Chinese no 
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r common security interests under the “1961 PRC-DPRK Treaty 
of Friendship, Cooperation and Mutual Assistan
proper international status for the PRC. In
m 
     
longer maintain the traditional “lips and teeth” relationship with the DPRK. Scott Snyder 
argues that “there is no question that the lips and teeth relationship between Pyongyang 
and Beijing has been obscured by the dynamic double-digit growth in Sino-South Korean 
trade and investment over the past decade.”168 The lack of a mutually beneficial agenda, 
the DPRK’s domestic problems, nuclear uncertainties, and improving Sino-ROK and 
Sino-American relations have prevented the PRC-DPRK alliance from improving.169   
C. PRC-DPRK ALLIANCE COHESION 
Using a narrow, military-focused definition of alliance cohesion, this thesis 
examines how much Beijing and Pyongyang have stayed together and cooperated to 
defend and promote thei
ce.” The treaty explicitly states that “in 
case one of the contracting parties should be exposed to an armed attack by one or several 
states and thereby involved in war, the other party must immediately and through all 
means grant military and other assistance.”170  Despite a lack of reliable information 
about the Sino-DPRK alliance, this thesis attempts to measure its cohesion according to 
three dimensions: (1) the level of consensus on security issues between the two allies, (2) 
the frequency, level, and nature of military exchanges and assistances, such as arms 
transfers, military-to-military contacts, and joint operations, and (3) PRC food and energy 
aid to the DPRK, which could be used for military purposes. 
1. Compromise on Security Issues 
Deng and his successor Jiang Zemin set the aim of the PRC’s foreign policy as 
establishing a favorable security environment for stable economic growth and obtaining a 
 order to do so, both leaders put economic 
prosperity at the top of the national agenda. Domestically enhancing Chinese socialis
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997 the DPRK as only “one of [China’s] neighbors” and stated Beijing 
                                                
and diplomatically improving its relations with many Western countries are included 
under the “five principles of peaceful coexistence” and Deng’s 24 Character Strategy 
(meaning “observe calmly; secure our position; cope with affairs calmly; hide our 
capacities and bide our time; be good at and maintain a low profile; and never claim 
leadership”).171 Given this framework for PRC foreign policy, Beijing’s secu
 the Korean peninsula has shifted to maintaining the status quo on the Korean 
peninsula, rejecting Korean forced or coerced reunification.172 As a consequence, there is 
significant evidence of an increasing gap in the perspectives of the security environment 
between Beijing and Pyongyang. First, despite Pyongyang’s request, in 1991 Beijing 
supported United Nations representation for both Koreas and opened diplomatic relations 
with the ROK in 1992.  
Second, while Beijing has frequently used supportive rhetoric for Pyongyang, that 
rhetoric has not increased Beijing’s substantive commitment. In fact, the spokesman for 
the PRC Ministry of Foreign Affairs in Beijing in 1995 said that “China does not believe 
the friendship treaty between Beijing and Pyongyang is a treaty requiring the dispatch of 
military force,” after Russian President Boris Yeltsin declared the Soviet-North Korean 
treaty had little value and indicated his desire to renegotiate the pact.173 In addition, PRC 
Vice Foreign Minister Tang Jiaxuan said at a public forum in Seoul in 1997 that the PRC 
was not willing to intervene automatically if the DPRK were to start a war.174 This kind 
of official Chinese rhetoric indicates Beijing’s reluctant attitude to enhance its military 
relationship with Pyongyang.  Their position became even clearer when Premier Li Peng, 
the second most powerful politician in the PRC under Deng and Jiang, explicitly 
emphasized in 1
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 Jintao and 
Beijing’s ambassadors to the UN, frequently mention both officially and unofficially that 
the DP  wi eps engaging in bad behavior and 
threaten
would not expand its political and military ties with Pyongyang, approve any kind of 
secret contacts between them, or provide the DPRK with the newest weapons and 
equipment.175 More recently, in 2003, Beijing proposed to Pyongyang again that they 
renegotiate the “mutual assistance” terms of the 1961 treaty. (Pyongyang refused 
Beijing’s proposal, stating that the “time is not good” to discuss the matter).176 
Third, during 1995 and 1998, when the DPRK underwent its worst famines 
(which raised international attention to the country’s situation and led to a serious 
infusion of international humanitarian support and aid), Beijing did not resume senior-
level mutual visits used as a major channel between Beijing and Pyongyang to discuss 
security issues, but rather pursued friendly, cooperative relations with other Western and 
neighboring countries.177  
Fourth, the PRC seems to have been frustrated by Pyongyang’s unexpectedly 
extreme behavior and decision to ignore constant warnings by the PRC. These factors 
produced “grave concern” for the Chinese, especially when the DPRK conducted a series 
of missile and nuclear tests in the 2000s. 178  Eventually Beijing undertook tougher 
measures against Pyongyang, including voting for UN Resolution 1695 in 2006 and UN 
Resolution 1874 in 2009. In addition, high level PRC officials, including Hu
RK ll face serious consequences if it ke
ing regional stability.179 Today, many Chinese analysts expect that if Pyongyang 
continues with further nuclear tests and keeps ignoring tough warnings from Beijing and 
other countries, Beijing might revoke its barely-maintained mutual defense treaty with 
Pyongyang.180  
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that the PRC’s unilateral preparation of military operations in the vicinity 
of the 
exchanges and assistance, such as arms transfers, military-to-military contacts and joint 
ope  
 “flesh and blood” or “brother-in-
                                                
 Lastly, Beijing reportedly has unilateral contingency plans in the event of 
instability in the DPRK without sharing them with Pyongyang. As not much information 
has been released about the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) contingency plans, it is 
difficult to interpret Beijing’s real intentions toward the DPRK regime. Many Chinese 
experts believe 
DPRK as well as within DPRK territory shows that Beijing lacks confidence in 
Kim Jong-il’s regime.181 Beijing reportedly prepared approximately 50,000-75,000 PLA 
troops to support the DPRK when tensions between Washington and Pyongyang peaked 
in May 1994. However, Western analysts assert that Beijing’s primary intention was not 
to defend the DPRK against a possible U.S. strike in accordance with the 1961 Sino-
DPRK treaty, but rather to stabilize northeastern regions in the PRC, prevent North 
Korean refugees from flooding its borders, and prevent U.S.-DPRK military actions from 
escalating into war. Unclear movements by PLA troops near the Sino-DPRK border in 
2003, when U.S.-DPRK tension increased again due to the DPRK’s second nuclear crisis, 
also raise questions about the current state of the Sino-DPRK military alliance. In this 
regard, foreign newspapers recently asserted that some of the PLA’s major military 
exercises, such as the Peace Mission, an annual Sino-Russian exercise conducted in 
northeastern China since 2005, “may be intended to intimidate the DPRK.”182 
2. Military Exchanges and Assistance 
The gap between Beijing’s and Pyongyang’s perspectives on ideology, politics, 
economics and geostrategy has widened since the end of the Cold War. One of the most 
critical changes in the PRC-DPRK alliance is the frequency, level, and nature of military 
rations. Today, the distant and limited relationship between the PLA and North
Korean People’s Army (KPA) no longer resembles their
arms” relationship of the 1950s to the 1970s. Indeed, the precise amount of cooperation 
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ue that the PLA-KPA 
“military exchange, joint operations, and substance” relationship has been weakening 
since Kim Il Sung died in 1994 and the two countries’ leaders walked farther in opposite 
directions.184   
egard sfers, s Tra se from 8 
in Table 3 shows that Soviet w d technologies were available and more 
attractive to Pyongyang than those available from the PRC during the Cold W ra. For 
he D  mostly on the Soviets for advanced weapon systems, including 
MiG-29s, Su-25s, SA-7/16s, and T-62/72s, with relatively little reliance on the PRC.185 
While contributing a relatively small a nt compared to the USSR, the PRC stopped its 
“official” transfer of conventional weapons to the DPRK in the mid-1980s “in 
consideration o  toward milit y stability on the Korean peninsula.”186 This is 
arguably a no r of disco e PRC-D Even after the Soviet 
Union collapse  rejected a n er of Pyongyang’s requests to transfer whole 
weapon sys rovidin e parts, repair tools, and other logistics 
materials.187 For instance, in March 2003 the PRC turned down the DPRK’s request for 
weapons to prepare for a U.S. milita  and even rejected Kim Jong-il’s request for 
military aid a ense systems during his visit that same year. Instead, 
Beijing has agreed to “sell” military hardware, such as trucks and naval components, to 
the DPRK.188 often bee astic about Pyongyang’s absurd requests for 
large quantities of advanced arms and software, much of which it cannot afford. For 
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example, KPA Marshal O Chin U requested more Luda-class destroyers and diesel 
submarines than the PLA Navy itself had in the early 1990s.189    
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2000s BTR-80A (IFV) 32 N/A N/A 
Table 3.   Transfers of major conventional weapons in comparative perspective, the USSR-
DPRK and PRC-DPRK.190 
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ining the f ature, and level o l and m tacts 
between the PRC and DPRK is also a 191  As 
shown u n 1989 and 2008 th n 10 mutual v ts every 
year, except during 2006 when the PRC was engaged in the Six Party Talks. During 1998 
and before Jia 2001, both count cussion of mutual 
securi es number of  
Chinese delegations focused on dealing with the DPRK’s nuclear weapons programs. In 
those s,  PRC-DPRK military-to ts between major 
officials like presid s, and high-ranking officers of the PLA and 
KPA in fact decreased (see Table 4). 
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 in Fig re 7, betwee ere were less tha isi
ng’s visit in ries had almost no dis
ty issu . During the larger visits in 1994-1995 and 2003-2007, most
period  the number of -military contac
ents, defense minister
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Year To DPRK To PRC # of visits
1989 GS Zhao Ziyang (Wu Xuequin, Zhu Liang) CMC VC Liu Huaqing 
COGS Choe Kwang  
GS Kim Il-sung  4 
1990 
GS Jiang Zemin  
DM Qin Jiwei  
PLAN PC Li Yaowen 
GS Kim Il-sung  
DCOGS Li Chong Chan 5 
1991 Nanjing MRPC Shi Yuxiao  PLAN Commander Zhang Lianzhong 
DM Oh Jin U 3 
1992 
SP Yang Shangkun 
Jinan MRC Zhang Wannian  
Jinan MRPC Song Qingwei  
GSD ED Director He Ping  
PLAN PC Wei Jinshan 
KPAN Commander Kim Il Chul  
DCOGS Chun Jae Sun 
7 
1993 
DM Chi Haotian  
DCOGS Li Wenqing  
Gener
General Ok Bong Rin 
4 al Hong Xuezhi 
1
henyang MRC Wang Ke General Kim Hak Sam  
994 DDM Kim Jong Kak  COGS Choe Kwang  




MDN DFAB Sun Qixiang  
AMS PC Zhang Gong Guangzhou  
MRPC Shi Yuxia 
DDM Kim Jong Kak 
4 
1996 
ILD Deputy Director Dai Bingguo  
North Sea FC Wang Jiying 
Shenyang MRPC Jiang Futang 
General Jung Chang Yol 
4 
1997 
MNDFAB Col. Li Donghui 
GLD PC Zhou Kunren 
DCOGS Li Bong Juk 
3 
1998     0 
1999    0 
2000 
NPC Chairman Li Peng  
DM Chi Haotian 
NDC Chairman Kim Jong-il (secret 
visit) 3 
2001 President Jiang Zemin NDC Chairman Kim Jong-il 2 
2002     0 
2003 Director of GDP DC Gen. Cho Myong-rok 2 
2004 
Delegation of Chinese People’s Volunteer 
Army 
NDC Chairman Kim Jong-il(secret) 
2 
2005   0 
2006 
President Hu Jintao 
Deputy Dept. Director of AMS Shao Hua 
DNC Chairman Kim Jong-il (secret) 
DCOGS of KPA 4 
2007 
 KPA military delegation 
Secretary of KPA Chae Tae-bok 2 
2008   0 
Table 4.   The PRC-DPRK military-to-military contacts, 1989–2008.193 
                                                 
ef of General Staff); DCOGS (Deputy Chief of General Staff); DM (Defense Minister); DDM 
(Dep r); GLD (General 
Logi ense); MRC (Military 
Reg
193 Ibid.; Abbreviation: AMS (Academy of Military Science); CMC (Central Military Commission); 
COGS (Chi
uty Defense Minister); FAB (Foreign Affair Bureau); FC (Fleet Commande
s Department); GS (General Secretary); MND (Ministry of National Defstic
ion Commander); PC (Political Commissar). 
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The majority of regular visits by Chinese officials and PLA officers are symbolic 
goodwill visits, not task-oriented meetings on salient military and security issues. 194  
There are significantly fewer high-level visits since the early 1990s and Beijing seems to 
have been careful not to attach significance to these visits. For example, when Pyongyang 
attempted to use the visit of a PLA Navy ship in 1996 as a propaganda tool to exaggerate 
its military relationship with Beijing, PRC officials and PLA officers minimized the 
significance of their visit, characterizing it as a “normal part of the minimally acceptable 
commemoration of the thirty-fifth anniversary of the PRC-DPRK friendship 
agreement.”195 
In contrast, the PRC has improved its military relationships with the United States, 
to-military contacts ranging from working-level to high-level contacts between the PLA 
and th
immediately after critical incidents like the 1999 bombing and the 2001 EP-3 collision. 
ROK and even Japan since the mid-1990s. Figure 8 indicates the frequency of military-
e United States starting in 1993, when President Clinton reopened military-to-
military ties for the first time since the 1989 Tiananmen Square Massacre. Except in 1999 
and 2001 when the PRC embassy in Belgrade was bombed by NATO and the EP-3 
incident occurred, both countries have been actively involved military-to-military 
contacts. Since 1997, both countries have participated in the Defense Consultative Talks 
(DCT) almost every year, and the U.S. Undersecretary of Defense and Commander of 
U.S. Pacific Command (PACOM) visits the PRC, while a PLA delegation of recently 
promoted generals and flag officers visits the United States. It is significant that U.S.-
PRC military-to-military contact did not decrease during the Taiwan Strait crisis in 1994–
1995, and both sides realize the usefulness of military-to-military contacts as tools of 
“communication, conflict avoidance, and crisis management.”196 In fact, the number of 
contacts and the range of topics they deal with quickly increased and have expanded 
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 Figure 8.   
 Chairman of the ROK Joint Chiefs 
of Staff
Frequency of military contacts between the PRC and United States/ROK.197 
The PRC-ROK military relationship also began to deepen in 1999 with an 
unprecedented visit to Seoul by PRC Defense Minister Chi Haotian in response to the 
ROK Defense Minister Cho Song-tae’s visit to Beijing earlier that year.  President Kim 
Dae-jung and Premier Zhu Rongji’s agreed to pursue a “full-scale cooperative 
partnership” that included military ties in 2000. These visits reflect significant changes in 
Beijing’s military relationship with Seoul and a break from its traditional consideration of 
Pyongyang.198 The top leaders of the two countries began to discuss military exchange 
programs, including naval ship visits and joint military exercises. In 2001, ROK Army 
Chief of Staff General Kil Hyoung-bo made the first visit to the PRC since the end of the 
Korean War, followed by a precedent-setting visit by
 General Cho Yung-kil and his staff.199 Foreign Ministers and Defense Ministers 
of each country have met almost every year since 2000, and in 2002 delegations of the 
                                                 
197 The author created the graph based on data from the following sources: Shirley A. Kan, “U.S.-
China Military Contacts: Issues for Congress,” CRS Report for Congress, RL32496 (April 15, 2009); ROK 
Ministry of National Defense, Defense White Paper (issued from 2000 to 2008). 
198 Scott Snyder, “China-Korea Relations: Upgrading Communication Channels, Messages Are 
Gettin Comparative Connections, Vol. 2, No.1 (April 2000), 67. 
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h for Seoul to Swallow?” Comparative Connections, Vol. 2, No. 3 (October, 2000), 85; “China-Korea 




h Seoul], which will be beneficial to peace, stability and development in 
this region.”200 
’ o d r i h R
Foreign aid is the most significant factor in m
s y th P  M  ntr  h o d anitari id th P , 
especia ese countries and 
observers in the World Food Programme (WFP) suspect that Kim Jong-il used the 
foreign




PLA, including Chief of the General Staff of the PLA Army General Fu Zuanyou, visited 
Seoul to discuss bilateral military exchanges and regional security issues. In November 
2008, both militaries finally decided to establish naval and air force hotlines after holding 
discussions for over a year. After the DPRK conducted nuclear tests on May 25, 2009, 
ROK Minister of Defense Lee Sang-hee visited Beijing to meet Vice President Xi Jinping, 
who is slated to succeed Hu Jintao in 2012, and Defense Minister Liang Guanglie. During 
the meeting, Xi stated that “Beijing look[s] forward to boosting friendship and 
cooperation [wit
3. The PRC s Fo d an  Ene gy A d to t e DP K 
aintaining economic and social 
tabilit  in e D RK. any cou ies ave ffere  hum an a  to e D RK
lly during and after the 1996-1998 famine. Analysts in th
 aid for military purposes, and thus sought to provide North Korean with food 
only under specific and strict conditions. However, as Pyongyang’s only traditional, 
responsible ally, Beijing has unconditionally provided a huge amount of aid, without 
regard for the DPRK’s possible use of the assistance.201 This said, changes in the amount 
of the PRC aid to Pyongyang is an important indicator reflecting the cohesion of the 
PRC-DPRK alliance. Table 5 shows the amount of PRC energy aid (coal, crude oil, 
diesel, and heavy fuel oil) and grain aid since 1991.  
Although the PRC provided large amounts of energy and food aid immediately 
the supply of food export to the DPRK. This led to a significant decrease in food aid i
4 and 1995.  Kim Jong-il threatened to withdraw from the NPT in 1994, instigating 
the DPRK’s first nuclear crisis. Aid increased slightly in 1999, mainly due to increasin
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mpt to reduce aid to 
Pyongyang in mid-1996, Pyongyang’s reaction was extreme; it threatened Beijing by 
redeveloping ties with Taiwan, and eventually received another 100,000 tons of food 
from the PRC.  
Yr 1994 1996 97 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 
food aid during the 1996-98 famine. The famine aroused Chinese concerns about an 
influx of North Korean refugee if the DPRK were to collapse. Surprisingly, Beijing 
increased only energy aid to the DPRK during the famine, while food aid stayed flat. In 
fact, the amount that Beijing initially offered in May 1996 was only 10 percent of the 
DPRK’s demand for 200,000 tons of food aid.202 After Beijing’s atte
 
1991 1992 1993 1995  19
Oil 1100 1100 1050 830 1020 N/A 50 80 400 14 45 47 10 N/A 
Food 300 620 740 310 150 120 150 100 150 40 200 330 220 130 
WFP1 N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A 50 360 400 600 460 950 350 290 300 
Table 5.   Amount of the PRC’s oil and grain aid.203 
Based on this trend of decreasing and inconstant PRC aid to the DPRK, Eberstadt 
argues that a primary reason Kim Jong-il’s regime has not collapsed since North Korea’s 
most serious famine is not because of the PRC’s implicit aid—which remained steady 
between 1998 (U.S. $339 million) and 2003 (U.S. $341 million)—but because a number 
of new sources of capital emerged for Kim Jong-il.  These alternative sources include a 
huge amount of unconditional aid from the ROK, consistent with its “Sunshine Policy,” 
and illicit transactions from the DPRK’s international counterfeiting, weapons trafficking 
and drug trafficking.204 In addition, the PRC has decreased free, “grant-type aid” to the 
DPRK of the type the USSR provided for its communist allies during the Cold War era.  
                                                 
202 Moore, “How North Korea threatens China’s interest: Understanding Chinese ‘duplicity’ on
North Korean nuclear issue,” 8. 
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from
http
, “Assistance to North Korea,” 
Con es 
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mea orld Food Programme’s food aid to the DPRK.   
203 The author created the table based on data from the following sources: Data between 1991
 Korea Trade Investment Promotion Agency, “North Korea trade factsheet,” 
://www.kotra.or.kr/main/trade/nk/material/select/jsp; Data between 1996 to 2005 from Jaewoo Choo, 
“Mirroring North Korea’s Growing Economic Dependence on China,” Asian Survey, Vol. 48, No. 2 
(Ma pril 2008); WFP data from Mark Manyin and Mary Nikitinrch/A
gressional Research Service (CRS) Report for Congress, R40095 (May 20, 2009). Figures include sal
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ns the U.N. W
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The PRC has instead increased sales of strategic goods and direct investment, providing 
the DPRK with food, energy and commodities at a “friendship price” or as a long-term 
loan, as shown in the Table 6.205 An interesting trend identified in the table is that the 
ratio of the PRC’s aid to its overall exports to the DPRK has dropped rapidly since 
“pragmatic” leader Hu Jintao assumed the presidency in 2002.          
  
Year 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 
PRC’s export (U.S. $ mil) 329 45 1 467 628 795 1 57
Aid to DPRK (U.S. $ mil) 48.4 27.6 69.1 16.0 10.9 14.6 
Ratio (aid/export) 14.7 6.1 12.1 3.4 1.7 1.7 
Table 6.   The PRC’s annual grant-type aid to the DPRK, 1994–2004.206 
In a policy paper presented to the PRC’s Politburo after Pyongyang admitted 
 for nuclear weapons to U.S. diplomat James Kelly in 
2002, C
se currencies.209 
                                                
developing highly enriched uranium
hinese top-level officials spoke freely about cutting energy and food aid even 
more, and discussed opening their border to more North Korean refugees.  This 
eventually resulted in a three-day shutdown of the Sino-DPRK oil pipeline.207 Similarly, 
after Pyongyang declared possession of nuclear weapons and its intention to withdraw 
from the PRC-chaired Six-Party Talks in February 2005, Beijing decided not to give “any 
further financial aid in the form of cash payments.” The PRC restricted its oil and food 
aid to Pyongyang due to “Chinese frustration with North Korea and the lack of 
accountability in how the aid was spent.” 208  Moreover, Beijing cooperated with 
Washington in freezing North Korean financial assets at Macau China’s Banco Delta 
Asia (BDA) which has been designated a “primary money laundering concern” and is 
accused of helping Pyongyang launder counterfeit U.S. and Chine
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hina,” Asian Survey, Vol. 48, No. 2 (March/April 2008), 364. 
207 Moore, “How North Korea threatens China’s interest: Understandin
h Korean nucl
208 Ibid., 9. 
209 Kan and  Niksch, “Guam: U.S. Defense Deployme
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 Guam, and by improving its allies’ capabilities. The growing capabilities of 
potential en
                                                
Recently, in response to the DPRK’s 2006 missile and nuclear tests, Beijing cut 
off a significant amount of oil to the DPRK, a clear signal of the price of ignoring 
Beijing’s warnings. The PRC also ordered Chinese banks to temporarily stop financial 
transfers to the DPRK and closed three of the four customs offices in northeastern China 
that handled trade with the DPRK.210 Simultaneously, Beijing sided with the UN Security 
Council in passing a resolution imposing sanctions on Pyongyang, including bans on 
sales to or exports from the DPRK of military goods, nuclear or missile-related items, and 
even luxury goods; they also began searching trucks crossing the Sino-DPRK border.211 
In 2009, Beijing, along with the ROK and Japan, suspended heavy fuel oil shipments to 
Pyongyang, fuel designated as energy assistance to the DPRK in the September 2005 Six 
Party Talks.  China has not delivered the remaining amount, 55,000 metric tons of heavy 
fuel oil equivalent.212 
D. CONCLUSION 
From a realist perspective, the security environment around the PRC-DPRK 
alliance since the end of the Cold War has become more unstable due to an imbalance of 
power and increasing threats from the United States and its allies in East Asia. The 
United States has attempted to maintain its hegemonic power in the region by improving 
both strategic and tactical capabilities of U.S. forces in Japan, the ROK, the Philippines, 
Okinawa and
emies and rivals’ military power are constant threats to the PRC and DPRK, 
particularly when Sino-U.S./Japan/Taiwan and DPRK-U.S./ROK relationships 
deteriorate, as they did during the Taiwan Strait crises, DPRK nuclear crises, the 
Belgrade bombing and the EP-3 incidents. For these reasons, realists would expect the 
Sino-DPRK alliance to remain as strong as in the Cold War era.  
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 contrast, this thesis finds that Chinese self-perceptions, their perceptions of 
others, and Beijing’s perspective on Korean peninsula security issues have altered.  
Consequently, the PLA’s missions, roles, and strategy in the region have also changed, 
based not only on realist material variables but also on ideational variables that have 
emerged in the Chinese leadership and public. Since Deng’s era, and particularly since 
the end of the Cold War, growing Chinese self-confidence and activism in domestic and 
international affairs, the PRC’s increasing commitment to international security and 
economic institutions, and China’s increasingly favorable perspective on the United 
States and South Korea h sform ing’s ch to issues from 
belligerent, c  r  t te, pra Despi r 
limited parti hina itics, e eas rts to  
information about domestic and international affairs and the growing influence of public 
opinion on Beijing’s decision-making process continue to create new challenges for 
Beijing ts all with P  to  
military assistance to the DPRK, in accordance to the 1996 PRC-DPRK Treaty, and to 
side with Pyongyang against the internati omm e e
burden on Beijing. For this reason, substantial cooperation between the PRC and the 
DPRK on mutual security issues and military exchanges and assistance, including arms 
sa  an aid, rt,  alliance coh
weakened.   
le 7 summarizes the values of the key variables of material (realist) and 
of 
the PRC-DPRK alliance during the post-Cold War era cannot be explained exclusively by 
external threats and interests. It can only be explained by a combination of external 
security interests and changes in the Chinese collective identity that result from domestic 
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IV. SOUTH KOREAN IDENTITY AND THE U.S.-ROK ALLIANCE 
The ROK’s rapid economic development after the 1970s under authoritarian 
regimes, democratization beginning in the mid-1980s, and extreme changes in the 
international security environment of the Korean peninsula following the collapse of the 
Soviet Union in 1991 have significantly affected South Korean collective identity, 
altering their self-perceptions and perceptions of others. South Koreans have become 
confident of their accomplishments, gradually overcoming their long-held “shrimp 
among whales” mentality and embracing their growing stature on the world state as a 
major regional player. At the same time, these ideational changes have shifted South 
Korean perspectives on its traditional ally (the United States)
C). This creates new challenges and opportunities for the U.S.-ROK alliance. This 
chapter first assesses the main factors producing a new, different South Korean collective 
identity since the South Koreans have experienced rapid economic growth and vibrant 
democratization. It then examines these factors in detail, focusing on how they have 
affected South Koreans’ self-perception and their perspective of the United States, the 
DPRK, and the PRC, while transforming Seoul’s policy toward the U.S.-ROK alliance. 
This chapter argues that rising South Korean self-confidence and nationalism, growing 
activism in domestic and international affairs, and increasing commitment to democratic 
and free market values have constructively transformed South Korean attitudes toward 
the United States, consolidating shared values between the two countries and enhancing 
alliance cohesion. 
1. Gr
The ROK’s miraculous economic growth since the 1970s, the so-called “miracle
he Han river,” has produced the most significant impact on the self-confiden
South Koreans. The ROK’s economy is rated as one of the world’s most succe
marked the world’s eleventh largest economy; it joined the “rich man’s club,” the 
Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD), in 1996 and enjoy
 69




an overall growth rate of nine percent for three decades until the 1997-1998 Asian 
financial crisis.213 The Asian financial crisis damaged the reputation of ROK’s economy 
as an exemplar of development, it revealed a record of 
 and increased its vulnerability to foreign currencies. However, the ROK economy 
recovered from the recession astonishingly quickly compared with other bankrupt 
countries. The ROK paid off the International Monetary Fund (IMF) bailout loans sooner 
than expected and quickly regained its former GDP per capita (as of 2008, the ROK’s 
GPD per capita is approximately U.S. $27,600). 214  Since the early 2000s, with the 
growing confidence of the South Korean economy in the international markets, the ROK 
has sought to create free trade agreements (FTAs) with the United States, PRC, Japan and 
NATO, hoping to be a hub of a Northeast Asian economy.215  
From a diplomatic standpoint, a turning point in Seoul’s diplomatic p
e 1986 Asian Games and 1988 Olympics. When Seoul hosted its largest-ever 
international event in 1998, it expanded its relations with both Western democracies and 
communist countries, including the Soviet Union, the PRC, and many socialist countries 
in Eastern Europe; the ROK also became increasingly vigorous on the world stage to 
project its new national image.216 The ROK received membership in the United Nations, 
along with the DPRK, in 1991. Seoul’s peace overtures to Pyongyang, including inter-
Korea exchanges and economic cooperation, resulted in the “1992 Agreement on 
Reconciliation, Non-Aggression, and Exchanges and Cooperation between the South and 
North” and the “Joint Declaration of the Denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula.”217 
More recently, the successful inter-Korean summits in 2000 and 2007, the ROK’s “better 
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 capabilities and the decline of 
the DP
istic views 
of their ture that 95 
percent of South Korean respondents say that they are proud of being Korean and expect 
that the ROK will be bette
than expected” performance in the 2002 World Cup tournament it co-hosted with Japan, 
and the ROK’s hosting of the upcoming G-20 economic summit in 2010 also 
significantly shore up South Korean self-confidence.218  
From a military perspective, the ROK’s growing economy and technology have 
helped the rapid modernization of the ROK Armed Forces with a series of defense 
reforms that began in the early 1980s. For two decades, the ROK has been among the top 
15 countries with regard to military expenditures.219 Currently, the ROK Ministry of 
Defense is pursuing a U.S. $292 billion program to transform its military forces, called 
Defense Reform 2020. With the ROK’s advanced military
RK’s relative power, South Koreans have begun to think that they can and should 
be more involved in their own defense as well as in global security issues like counter-
terrorism, peacekeeping and humanitarian operations, and nonproliferation.   
The ROK’s growing self-confidence is reflected in South Koreans’ self-
perception. Many surveys show that the majority of South Koreans have optim
 fu . For instance, a 2007-2008 Pacific Forum CSIS survey indicates 
r off in 10 years. 220  In addition, public opinion surveys 
conducted by the Pew Global Attitude Project show that most South Koreans believe that 
their lives will improve over the next five years (67 percent in 2002 and 68 percent in 
2007) while less than 10 percent have pessimistic views in both surveys.221 At the same 
time, increased South Korean self-confidence is also reflected in increased nationalistic 
sentiment. Testimonials to growing South Korean nationalism include massive anti-
Japanese movements in response to the Japanese nationalistic statements on the issue of 
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rean peninsula, leading to calls for more 
symme
gnificantly. 226  The growing middle class 
eagerly sought political freedom
                                                
Dokdo/Takeshima and the revision of Japanese history textbooks, anti-American 
candlelight vigils protesting accidental incidents and misconduct by U.S. forces in the 
ROK, protests against the re-emergence of Chinese historical distortions, and extreme 
nationalistic enthusiasm during the Olympics and the World Cup games.222 Nationalism 
has grown particularly strong since the 2002 election of Roh Moo-hyun as president with 
high levels of support from the nationalistic younger generation, now in their 30s and 40s, 
that is assuming a leadership role in South Korean society. In his campaign, Roh 
emphasized national pride, restoration of the ROK’s sovereignty, and “Korea first” 
sentiments that appealed to the younger generations.223 
The new spirit of South Korean nationalism also affects the ROK public’s 
perspectives of the United States, the PRC, and the DPRK. It frequently increased 
resentment of U.S. security policy on the Ko
trical relations with the United States, greater sympathy for the DPRK, and 
interest in enhancing Korean or Asian values.224  
2. Democratization and the Growing Influence of Public Opinion 
During almost 30 years of South Korean authoritarian rule, public participation in 
domestic politics was suppressed and human rights were seriously limited. Presidents 
Park Chung-hee and Chun Doo-hwan justified their policies by exaggerating the threat 
from the DPRK and appealing to people’s concern for social order and continued 
economic prosperity via state-controlled public education and the media. 225 However, 
since the late 1970s, with the growth in the ROK’s economy, the middle class, the well-
educated and civil society all increased si
 and liberty, with violent protests against human rights 
abuses and suppression by the authoritarian regimes, especially that of President Chun, 
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l rights and political freedoms and expressing 
diverge
s that would 
never be revealed under prior authoritarian (central) governments. Such cases include the 




     
who took power by military coup in 1979 after the assassination of President Park and 
authorized the brutal Kwangju Massacre in May 1980. After a series of nationwide 
student demonstrations, President Chun agreed to direct elections for president, and in 
1987 ROK Army General Roh Tae-woo was elected president in Korea’s first direct 
election. (The election was tainted, however, as Roh was nominated by the outgoing 
military ruler President Chun, and the polling process of the 1987 presidential election 
was marred by corruption.) Five years later, in 1992, Kim Young-sam became the first 
civilian president chosen in a free and fair election, thus ending the 30-year legacy of 
authoritarian rule. Since then, South Koreans have experienced remarkable and vibrant 
democratization, exercising new civi
nt, progressive political viewpoints that would have been suppressed under earlier 
regimes. 227  
During the rapid democratization of the 1990s, government power became 
decentralized with increased public information and institutional accountability.228 For 
example, South Korean local governments were established in 1991 and their officials 
have been elected by popular vote since 1995, increasing local activism and public 
participation.229 In addition, South Koreans started to organize civil society organizations 
and request transparent investigations of many politically sensitive case
enten s of alleged DPRK’s spies, the No Gun Ri incident during th
ment-authorized political conspiracies against opposition politicians, and the 
Kwangju Massacre. In fact, almost 74 percent of current domestic NGOs in the ROK 
were organized between 1987 and 1996.230  
In contrast to the Cold War era (in particular under the authoritarian gover
for almost three decades) when it was almost impossible for the ROK’s public 
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c and foreign policies. The ROK is one of the most technologically advanced 
and Int
estic politics, allowing legalization of numerous 
previously prohibited political interest groups. As a result, South Koreans say that their 
democratic values have brought significant benefits to them, and the ROK has been rated 
as a “stalwart defender of democracy in Asia” by Western democracies.234 
om ea un o a or r
global powers trying to maintain their spheres of influence over the Korean peninsula, a 
major 
influence foreign and security policies, one of the most significant results of the ROK’s 
democratization has been the increasing importance of public opinion in the management 
of domesti
ernet-connected countries in the world.231 With a large population in a relatively 
small territory, increasing sources of media, and particularly the Internet, have given the 
South Korean public greater awareness and opportunity for on- and offline participation 
in politics. Many examples, including the 2002 presidential election and massive anti-
American candlelight vigils in 2002 and 2008, show the heavy impact of a new form of 
grassroots participation by millions of South Korean netizens on government policies, 
public opinion and public protests.232  
Furthermore, South Koreans have consolidated their democracy with two peaceful 
power transitions from the ruling party to the opposition party, in 1997 (President Kim 
Dae-jung’s election) and 2007 (President Lee Myung-bak’s election).233  The ROK’s 
democratization relaxed political restrictions, extended the ideological spectrum and 
expanded public participation in the dom
3. Fr  a W k Co try t  Maj  Playe  in the Region 
Historically, the ROK suffered from a series of conflicts among regional and 
geostrategic point in East Asia. 235  For this reason, many scholars argue that 
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ocated that the ROK would become a world-class country through 
Segyeh
Yea 19 1995 1996 1997 1998 
Korean identity was jeopardized by multiple sources in the twentieth century, including 
Japanese colonialism, the Korean War and subsequent national division, and the Cold 
War. 236   
However, after the 1990s, the ROK’s growing capabilities and self-confidence in 
the areas of economy, politics, diplomacy, and military have made South Koreans believe 
that their country, as a middle power, would be able to play a greater role of defending 
itself and promoting regional and global peace and prosperity. In particular, President 
Kim Young-sam adv
wa (globalization). 237 Although the Asian financial crisis encouraged some South 
Koreans to oppose further globalization, his successor President Kim Dae-jung believed 
that the ROK’s ruined economy could recover by implementing global standards and 
continuing to emphasize both democracy and a free market economy, as “two wheels of a 
cart” for successful globalization.238 As a result, the ROK’s participation in international 
organizations, both at the governmental and popular levels (NGOs), has increased 
markedly since the 1980s (see Table 8). 
 
r 60 1977 1984 1987 1989 1994 
Gov’t 19 39 37 39 41 47 48 50 51 52 
NGO 102 371 642 761 820 1,034 1,072 1,138 1,200 1,250 
Table 8.  
pinion survey conducted by Pacific Forum CSIS shows that almost 80 percent 
                                                
 The ROK’s membership in international governmental and civilian organization, 
1960–1998.239 
South Koreans believe that their country should take a more active leadership role 
in the regional and world economies and should be open to the international community. 
A public o
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of the S
icipation in multinational coalitions approved by the 
United 
     
outh Korean respondents welcomed foreign investment and influence in the ROK 
and 95 percent think that their country should take a more active role in world affairs. 
The Pew Global Attitude Project’s poll also indicates that 85 percent show strong 
enthusiasm for globalization.240 More recently, President Lee Myung-bak, who declared 
“Global Korea” as a foreign policy objective to enhance the ROK’s leadership role in 
regional and global security affairs, successfully hosted the ASEAN summit in 2009 and 
is preparing the ROK to host the G-20 summit, another big international economic event, 
in November 2010.  
From a military standpoint, South Koreans increasingly see active participation in 
international security issues as their duty as a major player in the international 
community. For this reason, over 80 percent of the public strongly supports (and few 
oppose) the use of their troops in regional and global security matters like UN 
peacekeeping operations and part
Nations.241 In sum, South Koreans largely shared a collective identity as a rising 
middle power that strongly supports democracy, a free market economy and globalization. 
B. SOUTH KOREAN PERCEPTIONS OF “OTHERS” 
1. South Korean Perceptions of the DPRK 
The collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991 accelerated the isolation of the DPRK 
and shifted the balance of power in the ROK’s favor. South Korean pride and confidence 
in their diplomatic, economic, and military superiority vis-à-vis the economically 
stagnant DPRK soared in the early 1990s. As a result, their fear of the DPRK diminished 
and their sympathy and pity for North Koreans increased.242 These changes in South 
Korean perceptions of the DPRK are reflected in Seoul’s DPRK policy and in public 
opinion.  
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t” and “Joint Declaration” between the ROK and 
DPRK 
ent Roh Moo-hyun continued 
this po
expanded the range and scope of inter-Korean exchanges. In order to gain public support, 
 
     
At the governmental level, President Roh Tae-woo’s administration undertook the 
policy of “Nordpolitik” and started to implement active engagement toward Pyongyang, 
resulting in the 1992 “Basic Agreemen
that institutionalized a Joint Military Commission and Joint Control Commission 
to implement substantial, practical commitments by both sides.243 President Kim Young-
sam advocated a more liberal approach to the DPRK than the previous authoritarian 
governments. Seoul proposed a summit meeting between President Kim Young-sam and 
the DPRK’s leader Kim Il Sung to improve inter-Korean relations in 1994. (However, the 
summit was cancelled due to the sudden death of Kim Il-sung.) This misfortune was 
followed by Four-Party talks to open a dialogue among regional powers in 1996. 
President Kim Young-sam supported direct talks between Washington and Pyongyang 
and approved the shipment of 150,000 tons of rice to the North in 1995, the first ROK 
direct assistance to the DPRK.244 
From President Kim Dae-jung’s and Roh Moo-hyun’s perspectives, it was 
impossible to change the DPRK unless South Koreans first changed their perspective on 
the DPRK.245 They believed that South Korean fears of the DPRK had been shaped by 
the framework of the Cold War, which held them to a containment policy against the 
North. President Kim Dae-jung introduced a new, comprehensive approach emphasizing 
patience, the “Sunshine Policy,” and his successor Presid
licy. Removing the characterization of the DPRK as “the main threat” from the 
ROK Defense White Paper in 2004, President Roh went even further, advocating that 
South Korea help Pyongyang resolve the security concerns that motivated its missile tests 
and efforts to acquire nuclear weapons.246 Under this new policy, Seoul significantly 
these two administrations reinforced optimistic views of the DPRK. They supported
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provocations, leading to a decline in public support for the engagement policy and more 
negative South Korean attitudes toward the North. For example, during the DPRK’s first 
                                                
tighter inter-Korean relations as essential to national security and to a future role for a 
reunified Korea as a stabilizer of the region, all of which encouraged nationalistic 
sentiment in the South Korean people. 
As a consequence, South Korean public attitudes toward the DPRK have 
fluctuated widely since the 1990s. Prior to the 2000 summit, almost half of South 
Koreans viewed Kim Jong-il as a dictator. Immediately after the summit, that figure 
dropped to less than 10 percent, and over 97 percent indicated that they would welcome a 
visit by Kim Jong-il to Seoul.247 This trend accelerated when Pyongyang accepted North-
South family reunions for the first time and the North-South railroad project in 2000. In 
addition, the historic scene of both Koreas’ athletes marching together under a single flag 
at the opening ceremony of the 2000 Sydney Olympics stirred up the South Koreans’ 
“brotherhood” attitude toward North Koreans.248 Despite the second DPRK’s nuclear 
crisis in the early 2000s, a 2006 Gallup World Poll found that 53 percent of South Korean 
respondents did not feel a serious threat from the DPRK’s nuclear weapons, while 43 
percent did feel threatened.249  Even after the DPRK’s nuclear test in October 2006, 
many progressive South Koreans, including Presidents Kim Dae-jung and Roh Moo-hyun, 
argued that the DPRK nuclear test occurred not because of the ROK’s Sunshine Policy 
but because of the Bush administration’s coercive DPRK policy that made Pyongyang 
consider nuclear weapons as its “last resort to survive.”250 
But, Seoul’s friendly approaches to Pyongyang have failed so far due to the 
DPRK’s insincere feedback to the ROK’s cooperative gestures and its continued 
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nuclear crisis, Pyongyang frequently brought politically sensitive issues to the negotiating 
table to split U.S.-ROK relations. At the same time, only minimal progress was seen on 
the most urgent and important issues, like the transparency of the DPRK’s nuclear policy 
and its international obligations as a member of the NPT.251 Pyongyang rejected the 
South Korean name for the light water reactor that KEDO had promised to install in the 
DPRK in return for giving up its nuclear program. Pyongyang also rejected the exchange 
of special envoys between the two Koreas, fueling South Korean resentment at being 
treated as an outsider and excluded from negotiations on critical Korean security 
issues.252 When a South Korean commercial ship bearing rice aid arrived in the DPRK in 
1995 and was forced to raise the DPRK flag, South Koreans severely criticized 
253
hopes am e 
possible, th rinciple of 
reciprocity but rather on the idea of “provide first and expect later,” was increasingly 
criticized by both the South Korean public and the Bush administration.254 Figure 9 
shows how Chosun Ilbo, the most popular South Korean newspaper, framed issues in 
their coverage of the DPRK before President Kim Dae-jung's administration (1992-1998) 
compared to their coverage during and after his administration (1998-2003).  This shows 
that the South Korean public had begun to emphasize the need for greater reciprocity in 
the relations with the North. 255  During this period, other major progressive and 
nationalistic South Korean newspapers, such as Hangyoreh Daily, also toned down their 
strong rhetoric toward the ROK’s engagement with the DPRK.256 
 
                                                
Pyongyang’s behavior.  In addition, despite the fact that inter-Korean summits raised 
ong progressives that the cherished vision of a “unified” Korea might finally b
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 re 9.   Frequency of the most prevalent news frames regarding inter-Korean issues in 
Chosun Ilbo, before the Kim Dae-jung administration (1992–1997) compared 




Figure 10.   Frequency of North Korean Provocative Actions, 1990–2006.258 
Furthermore, South Koreans lost patience with North Korea’s provocative actions 
betw ies of een 1998 and 2006, including the 1998 DPRK’s submarine incident, a ser
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2. South Korean Attitudes Toward the PRC 
Like South Korean views of the DPRK, their views of the PRC are ambivalent 
nd conflicted because the PRC still looms large as a major uncertainty for security. 
From an economic perspective, since the 1992 normalization, the trade between the two 
countries increased by a factor of 628 in 26 years, making the PRC South Korea’s 
num 261 By 1995, the PRC was the largest single destination for 
 
     
Taepodong missile and nuclear tests, naval clashes in the Yellow Sea in 1999, 2002, and 
2009 in the vicinity of the Northern Limited Line (NLL), and constant DMZ provocations. 
In contrast to South Koreans’ expectations, such incidents did not seem to decrease 
despite Kim Dae-jung and Roh Moo-hyun’s warm overtures to the North (see Figure 10). 
More recently, South Korean patience was further reduced by the shooting death 
of a South Korean female tourist at the Mount Keumgang resort in July 2008. Pyongyang, 
claiming the tourist had entered a forbidden area, did not apologize or allow South 
Korean investigators to enter the DPRK, but instead blamed Seoul for the incident and 
demanded an apology from the South. 259  In addition, at the inter-Korean military
e in October 2008, the Lee administration’s first opportunity to discuss mutual 
actions to prevent similar incidents and reopen inter-Korean talks, the meeting time was 
taken up with complaints about leaflets disparaging the North Korean leadership 
distributed by South Korean NGOs with ties to North Korean refugees.260 Hence, after a 
period when views of the North improved, South Korean perceptions of the DPRK have 
started returning to their previously negative state. 
a
ber one trading partner.
South Korean foreign direct investment (FDI). More than a half of South Korean FDI
since 2003 has flowed into the PRC (ROK’s cumulative investment in the PRC surpassed 
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of advice on intra-Korean issues and the best 
commu
 
that in the United States in 2004).262  From a diplomatic perspective, the PRC grew 
steadily more important than other ROK neighbors because the PRC, as the DPRK’s only 
ally, has been the best source 
nication channel supplementing Seoul’s limited direct contacts with 
Pyongyang.263 In social and cultural perspectives, with their geographical proximity and 
cultural affinity, the total number of tourists between the two countries also soared up 
from 9,000 in 1988 to more than 4.8 million in 2006, surpassing that between the United 
States and ROK.264 Based on those increasing interaction, both the ROK and the PRC 
continue to seek expansion of their political, economic, social and cultural partnerships.  
As a result, South Korean attitudes toward the PRC and Chinese have 
significantly improved since the 1992 normalization. For instance, 38 percent of South 
Koreans picked the PRC as their most important economic partner in 1996, 43 percent in 
1998, 53 percent in 2002, and 67 percent in 2007.265 Many South Korean and Chinese 
analysts describe the Seoul-Beijing relationship in the 1990s as a “honeymoon” in which 
mutual understanding and physical interaction flourished.266 In 2001, 73 percent of South 
Korean respondents had a favorable view of the PRC, while only 66 percent expressed 
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e so-called “garlic war” between the 
PRC a the 
retaliatory tariffs on other South Korean goods in the Chinese markets that caused more 
than U.
favorable attitudes toward the United States. 267  For this reason, some analysts have 
argued that the ROK will inevitably side with the PRC as its natural ally, forsaking the 
alliance with the United States.268  
However, South Korean attitudes toward the PRC are greatly affected by a wide 
range of issues, such as economic competition, tainted Chinese products, unresolved 
historical disputes, domestic identity, and Beijing’s treatment of North Korean 
refugees. 269  From an economic standpoint, South Korean business communities are 
increasingly concerned about their growing vulnerability to cheap, plentiful Chinese 
products in overseas markets and their growing trade dependency on the PRC. For 
instance, PRC trade as a portion of ROK’s total trade increased from approximately 3 
percent in 1995 to almost 20 percent in 2006. 270  Trade disputes between the two 
countries have also increased. For example, during th
nd ROK in 2000, South Korean resentment soared due to massive, unfair, 
S. $100 million in losses.271 For this reason, although the ROK has given credit to 
the PRC’s role as a world economic powerhouse, 66 percent of South Koreans believe 
that a rising China will be an economic competitor to the ROK rather than a partner (31 
percent).272   
From a historical perspective, Beijing undertook a “Northeast Asia Project” to 
incorporate ethnic minority histories, including Korea’s ancient Koguryo kingdom, into 
the broader Chinese history. Almost every South Korean saw the project as a hegemonic 
attempt by the PRC, and the perception of the PRC as a threat spread rapidly in the 
                                                 
267 Ross, “Balance of Power Politics and the Rise of China: Accommodation and Balancing in East 
Asia,” 136. 
268 Glosserman and Snyder, “Confidence and Confusion: National Identity and Security Alliances in 
Nor
commodation and Balancing in East 
Asia
2009, 14. 
theast Asia,” 18. 
269 Ibid., 25. 
270 Chung, “China’s ‘Soft’ Clash with South Korea.” 471. 
271 Ross, “Balance of Power Politics and the Rise of China: Ac
,” 129. 
272 Weston Konishi and Mark Manyin, “South Korea: Its Domestic Politics and Foreign Policy 
Outlook,” Congressional Research Service (CRS) Report for Congress, September 30, 
 83
eninsula and its DPRK contingency plans.274 A number of South Korean public 
opinion
iction over South Korean human right abuses, democratization, and U.S.-ROK trade 
                                                
ROK.273 Like the PRC during the Korean War, ancient Chinese dynasties (such as the 
Tang dynasty), frequently attempted to prevent a united Korean peninsula. In light of this 
history, South Koreans keep a wary eye on the PRC’s ambiguous intentions toward the 
Korean p
 surveys conducted by major South Korean news services indicate that South 
Korean attitudes toward the PRC have deteriorated in the 2000s. According to polls in 
2002 by the Sisa Journal, in 2005 by Joong-ang Ilbo, and in 2008 by Kyunghyang 
Shinmoon, favorable South Korean views of the PRC decreased from 41 percent in 2002, 
to 29 percent in 2005, to 15 percent in 2008.275 A 2007 KBS public opinion poll shows 
that almost 60 percent of South Koreans say they do not like the PRC, and the Pew 
Global Attitude Project found that unfavorable views of the PRC were held by 42 percent 
of South Koreans in 2007 and 48 percent in 2008.276 
3. South Korean Attitudes Toward the United States and the U.S.-ROK 
Alliance 
During the last half century, the United States and ROK have had prosperous, 
successful relations that have brought mutual benefits. Based on their formidable alliance, 
the ROK has been able to enhance its security and promote its interests in recovering 
from the Korean War, becoming economically and militarily superior to its rival on the 
Korean peninsula, and gaining enough power to deter a North Korean threat. 
Simultaneously, the United States has been able to maintain regional peace and stability 
and promote its supreme values of democracy and free markets in the region. During the 
Cold War era, neither Americans nor South Koreans doubted the rationale, substance and 
purpose of their alliance, and thus the alliance remained stable and predictable despite 
fr
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nd attitudes toward both themselves and the United 
States.  
as a “protector” against the DPRK during the Korean 
War, a
for independence. 280 Other self-interested U.S. actions include tacit support of the South 
Korean authoritarian regimes and their coercive suppression, in particular during the 
 
 
     
issues.277 However, the end of the Cold War, along with the ROK’s rapid economic 
growth and vibrant democratization, has affected the foundation of the alliance, changing 
South Korean public perceptions a
Various factors have shaped South Korean attitudes toward the United States and 
U.S.-ROK alliance, including history, democratization, South Koreans’ growing self-
confidence, demographic changes in the ROK, inter-Korean relations, and 
misunderstandings between Seoul and Washington. First, historically, South Korean 
views of the United States were a “complex of mixture of feelings,” from “gratitude, 
fondness, and respect” to “lingering sense of resentment and distrust” as the United States 
has played a critical role in different stages of Korea’s history, including colonization, 
independence, U.S. military rule, the Korean War, military modernization, economic 
development, and democratization.278 On the one hand, the United States was perceived 
as a “liberator” of Koreans from Japanese colonialism after World War II, as a “sponsor” 
of an independent ROK in 1948, 
nd as a de facto military, economic, and political “security guarantor” during the 
Cold War era.279 On the other hand, the United States was perceived as seeking its own 
interests without regard for Korean interests when Washington rejected Korea’s request 
for American protection against Japanese colonialism in the early 1900s, made 
ambiguous plans for the post-war Korea at the Cairo Conference in 1943, and put Korea 
under international trusteeship with the Soviet Union despite the strong Korean demand 
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nship from a patron-client relationship to a more 
equal, s
                                                
Kwangju Massacre in 1980s, Washington’s strong pressure on Seoul to open its 
agriculture, financial, and service markets, and the imposition of “Super 301 legislation” 
to decrease U.S. trade deficits.281    
Second, from a political perspective, democratization has promoted a vigorous 
civil society and political freedom, increasing a domestic political divergence between 
the ROK’s pro-unification groups and conservatives. This affects the decision making 
process in ROK foreign policy toward the United States and the DPRK.282 With the rise 
of new, progressive South Korean political elites (the so-called the “386-generation”283), 
frictions between Washington and Seoul have become more frequent and the nature of 
the U.S.-ROK alliance has become increasingly controversial.284  With growing national 
pride and the demographic shift to a younger generation raised in the prosperous, 
democratic ROK, South Koreans seek to improve ROK’s status on the international stage, 
demand less dependence on foreigners in defending their security interests, and hope to 
transform the U.S.-ROK security relatio
ymmetric relationship.285  
Third, from a diplomatic standpoint, U.S. foreign policies toward East Asia and 
inter-Korean relations have played a critical role in shifting the South Korean perspective 
on the United States. For instance, during the DPRK’s first nuclear crisis in 1993-1994, 
Washington’s attempt to open direct talks with Pyongyang to find a peaceful, diplomatic 
resolution raised South Korean concerns of being excluded from a “process that directly 
affected critical South Korean national interests but over which the ROK had little 
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nited States.”287 As a result, South Korean public opinion toward the 
United 
orge W. Bush, who characterized North Korea as a “rogue state” and part 
of the “axis of evil,” were designed to increase tension on the Korean peninsula. Many 
South Koreans, including government officials, blamed the Bush administration for the 
stalemate in inter-Korean relations.288  
Fourth, these factors have shifted South Korean attitudes toward the United States 
more widely, frequently, and effectively since the 1990s, due to the explosive use of the 
media and the Internet in particular.289 With access to a variety of media sources, South 
Koreans reportedly average approximately five hours a day in media consumption 
activities, and the younger they are, the more information they seek from the Internet.290 
In the ROK, the Internet has been the catalyst for shaping public opinion and organizing 
public group activities, such as massive protests. Seoul, unlike Beijing, has not attempted 
to control and censor the Internet and netizens’ online activities. 291   Reporting by
                                                
influence.”286 With this feeling, South Koreans criticized both Seoul and Washington for 
their lack of diplomatic coordination regarding their DPRK policies. The Kim Young-
sam administration was criticized for its lack of an “independent” South Korean policy 
toward the DPRK and for putting “ROK’s national security subordinate to the global 
interests of the U
States deteriorated between 1994 and 1995. This is indeed an irony in light of 
realist expectations that the ROK would seek close ties with the United States in response 
to unstable security conditions during the 1993-1994 DPRK nuclear crisis. Similarly, a 
majority of South Koreans believed that the United States’ hawkish DRPK policy after 
the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks and a series of harsh comments about the DPRK 
by President Ge
 
progressive South Korean media like OhMyNews, PRESSian News, and Hangyoreh 
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291 Chun
Daily often contains strong nationalistic and even sensationalist overtones and distorted 
information. Such media reports increase serious misperceptions about both 
Washington’s and Seoul’s intentions, and inflame public sentiment.292 These media have 
been often misused for political purposes, including anti-government and anti-American 
demonstrations. 
Taking all these factors into account, South Korean attitudes toward the United 
States have changed since the end of the Cold War, fluctuating especially in the late 
1990s and the early 2000s. Figure 11 shows South Korean attitudes toward the United 
States (left) and the U.S.-ROK alliance (right) between 1988 and 2002, based on surveys 
conducted by the U.S. State Department, Gallup Korea, and other major South Korean 
news services. 
 
 Trends in South Korean attitudes toward the United States and the U.S.-ROK 
alliance.
Figure 11.  
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The decline of favorable perspectives on the United States in 1994–1995 is 
accounted for by increasing South Korean resentment of the unilateral approach to the 
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s in their economic security. For these reasons, South 
Korean
Korean summit stirred up South Korean hope for unification, increasing both South 
Korean confusion over its national identity and its perceptions of its ally and enemy, and 
dom . 
Pre  to 
alte ptions of North Koreans from “enemies seeking to conquer the South” to 
“br  
DPRK during the nuclear crisis and a confluence of the usual factors of trade frictions 
and public outrage over incidents involving U.S. military personnel stationed in the ROK. 
This decline was reversed quickly when Washington praised the significance of the 
ROK’s role in regional security affairs and confirmed its strong commitment to the 
ROK’s defense. In addition, President Kim Dae-jung, whose policy toward the DPRK 
differed significantly from his predecessor’s, anticipated that direct talks between 
Washington and Pyongyang would become a part of his Sunshine Policy. Thus, his 
administration actively encouraged Washington to engage with Pyongyang. President 
Clinton and his special advisor and policy coordinator William Perry strongly welcomed 
the ROK’s Sunshine Policy, which increased the sense of coherence between Washington 
and Seoul regarding their DPRK policies. 294   Moreover, President Kim Dae-jung 
repeatedly emphasized the importance of U.S. forces in the ROK (USFK), based on the 
U.S.-ROK alliance and its vital role in ROK security even after unification. In addition to 
the growing coherence between Washington and Seoul on security issues, South Koreans 
hurt by the 1997-1998 Asian financial crisis appreciated the key role of the United States 
and U.S.-led IMF bailout fund
s with favorable attitudes toward the United States soared from 61 percent in 1998 
to 71 percent in 2000.295 
However, generally positive South Korean views of the United States throughout 
most of the 1990s faced a series of turbulent moments after the inter-Korea summit in 
2000 and the U.S.-ROK summit between Bush and Kim Dae-jung in 2001. The inter-
estic divergence over Seoul’s approach toward the United States and DPRK
sident Kim Dae-jung and his successor Roh Moo-hyun persuaded South Koreans
r their perce
others and sisters needing South Korean help” in order to achieve their number one
                                                 




Bush’s “hawkish and arrogant” attitude more than Kim Jong-il for the inter-Korean 
reconciliation deadlock, growing tension on the peninsula, and even the DPRK’s nuclear 
tests.298 For example, a Korean Gallup Poll in 2002 reported that some 53.7 percent of 
South Koreans held “unfavorable” and “som  the 
United States, and in the 2003 poll, 62.9 percent of South Korean 
respondents said that the Bush adm  
l reported 
that those with favorable feelings toward the United States had deteriorated from 36 
percent
national objective, unification. 296  The 2001 U.S.-ROK summit revealed significant 
discord and distrust between the two governments regarding how to deal with the 
DPRK.297 As a result, many South Korean public opinion polls conducted by major 
South Korean media in the early 2000s indicated a negative shift in South Korean 
attitudes toward the United States. Almost half of the South Korean resp
ewhat unfavorable” attitudes toward
Sisa Journal 
inistration’s DPRK policy was not helpful for the
stability of the Korean peninsula. A Samsung Economic Research Institute pol
 in 2001 to 24.5 percent in 2003.299 A KBS poll showed that 43 percent of South 
Koreans blamed the United States for the DPRK’s 2006 nuclear test, while only 37 
percent blamed Pyongyang.300 
Many scholars and government officials in both countries have argued that these 
temporary shifts in South Korean perspectives on the United States in the early 2000s 
should not be exaggerated. 301  They assert that the polls can be misleading and the 
massive South Korean public disaffection regarding the United States fluctuates widely 
within short periods of time, a ubiquitous phenomenon seen in many other nations 
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Choice Dec. 1999 Nov. 2000 Jan. 2001 Mar. 2002 Jun. 2003 May 2004 
beginning in 2001.302 In fact, in contrast to the negative picture painted by some surveys 
that report only “positive” and “negative” choices, many other surveys that offered 
additional “neutral” or “don’t know” choices indicate that the majority of South Koreans 
have a neutral perspective on the United States, and individuals’ views vary from issue to 
issue depending on their personal, internal experiences (see Table 9).303 
 
Positive 38.7 30 15.9 23 25.4 22.8 
Neutral 31.6 51 36.7 46 46.9 60.1 
Negative 29.6 19 47.6 29.5 27.6 16.2 
Don’t Know N/A N/A N/A 1.4 N/A - 
Table 9.   Changing South Korean perceptions of the United States.304 
Moreover, given constant shifts in the ROK’s domestic politics due to the severe 
divergence on political, economic, and social issues, the apparent conflict in the U.S.-
ROK alliance in the early 2000s was not due to significant divergence between South 
Korean and American national interests. Rather, it resulted from the Bush 
administration’s unilateralism, and the lack of mutual understanding of each country’s 
new security environment and priorities, and problems that could be resolved by further 
deep dialogue and compromise. 305  In fact, under President Kim Dae-jung’s 
administration, Washington and Seoul officially answered the question of the future 
direction of their alliance, which has been raised by both governments since 1992. The 
32nd U.S.-ROK Security Consultative Meeting (SCM) Joint Communiqué in 2002 
explicitly stated that the “[U.S.-ROK] alliance will serve to maintain peace and stability 
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pid fluctuation of South Koran 
nationa
                                                
in Northeast Asia and the Asia-Pacific region as a whole, even after the immediate threat 
to stability has receded on the Korean peninsula.”306 In 2002, despite increasing strain on 
U.S.-ROK relations after a series of massive anti-American demonstrations and the 
presidential victory of progressive party leader Roh Moo-hyun, a critic of Washington’s 
Northeast Asia policies, overall U.S.-ROK relations were cordial and the new South 
Korean president quickly changed his attitudes toward the United States and undertook 
several significant steps to modernize the U.S.-ROK alliance.307 
Many statistical data also show that, despite some negative South Korean 
perceptions of the Bush’s administration, South Korean attitudes toward Americans and 
the U.S.-ROK alliance have been generally warm. The exception is the years 2001 and 
2002, when huge anti-American candlelight vigils were held in the ROK in response to a 
regrettable statement by Washington and how the USFK handled the case of two South 
Korean schoolgirls who were killed by an U.S. Army armored vehicle.308 A RAND 
analysis of South Korean attitudes finds that, despite ra
lism and/or anti-American sentiment in the early 2000s, over the last 15 years 
approximately 75 to 90 percent of South Koreans maintain strong support for the U.S.-
ROK alliance.309 Recent figures show that over 90 percent of South Koreans believe that 
the presence of U.S. military bases in the Korean peninsula is important to regional 
stability, even after unification.310 According to Gallup Korea polls and Chosun Ilbo 
polls, the proportion of South Koreans with “very favorable” and “somewhat favorable” 
views of the United States rose from 33.6 percent in February 2002 to 37.2 percent in 
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Decem
.S. Department of State shows 
that 62
ber 2002, and to 53.7 percent in November 2004.311 The U.S. Department of 
State’s INR polls also indicate that South Koreans who see the United States as their 
closest security partner in five to 10 years increased from 52 percent in 1996, to 60 
percent in 2000-2002, to almost 90 percent in 2007.312 In addition, according to the 
2007-2008 poll conducted by Pacific Forum CSIS and Asia Foundation, 77.8 percent of 
South Korean respondents had positive attitudes toward Americans, and this result is 
higher than for the Japanese respondents (63.1 percent). 313 Many other polls conducted 
by the Chicago Council on Global Affairs (CCGA), East Asia Institute (EAI), and the 
Pew Global Attitude project in 2008 also indicate that recent South Korean perspectives 
on the United States have become more favorable, coming close to Cold War-era 
figures.314 Moreover, a 2009 survey conducted by the U
 percent of South Koreans pick the United States as the most “beneficial political 
and diplomatic partner” to their security interests, in comparison to other key regional 
powers such as the PRC (19 percent) and Japan (10 percent).315 
Interestingly, the younger South Korean generations who experienced rapid 
democratization, globalization, the Asian financial crisis, the DPRK nuclear crises, 
massive anti-American demonstrations, the emergence of a rising China, continued 
conflicts with the PRC and Japan over history, and the global economic downturns in the 
1990s and 2000s seem to have adjusted their self-perceptions and views of South Korea’s 
neighbors in a more pragmatic manner. In other words, young South Koreans worry less 
about the North Korean threat and much more about strategic benefits to their economy 
and security from close ties with the United States.316  
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his contribution to the ROK’s democratization were appreciated by a majority of 
Americans. The robust common values of democracy and freedom have helped promote 
U.S.-ROK relations. 320  As a result, many U.S. government officials, scholars, and 
students have started to emphasize feelings of affinity between the United States and 
                                                
Another significant change in the South Korean public’s view of the U.S.-ROK 
alliance is that the U.S.-ROK alliance is no longer a politically polarizing issue in the 
ROK’s domestic politics. Even South Korean progressives recognize that the U.S. 
alliance has contributed to national and regional security.317 South Koreans have realized 
that a healthy, symmetric relationship in the alliance requires mutual contributions to 
common interests, and thus that they should focus not only on what they can receive from 
the United States but consider also what its ally demands from them. For this reason, 
approximate
tegic flexibility” for USFK and the majority of South Koreans advocate evolution 
of the alliance “from a singularly focused mission to a more robust value-based  
relationship” that looks beyond the Korean peninsula.318  
From the constructivist perspective, numerous factors have developed in 
American and South Korean societies over the past decades that promote convergence 
between the two countries. Politically, South Koreans strongly support American values 
of respect for democracy, the rule of law, and freedom of expression. The ROK, in fact, 
has been rated as a model of successful democratization.319 At the same time, remarkab
l improvements in the ROK have changed American perceptions of the ROK as a 
small, divided, poor, authoritarian country devastated by war. The ROK is now perceived 
as a small but strong and dynamic country, an exemplar of American style 
democratization and economic development. President Kim Dae-jung’s life history and 
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trading partner for the United States. Both governments signed the 
Korean
ROK. For instance, then-Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense Kurt Campbell stated 
before the U.S. Senate Committee on Foreign Relations in September 1998 that the U.S.-
ROK alliance should be more than a “treaty commitment” as both countries had 
maintained a “mutually beneficial partnership built on a shared stake in democracy and 
free markets.”321 Similarly, then-Ambassador to the ROK Stephen Bosworth valued the 
strong development of ROK’s democracy, noting in 1998 that “democracy ha[d] become 
in a real sense the cement of the overall relationship [between the United States and 
ROK].”322 
Economically, the ROK’s economy, until the Asian financial crisis a powerful 
example of the developing state, has since pursued intensive reforms to transform itself 
from a Japanese-style state-centric economy into an American-style free market 
economy.323 Bilateral trade between the two countries surpassed U.S. $83 billon in 2007, 
making the United States the fifth largest trading partner for the ROK, while the ROK is 
the seventh largest 
-U.S. Free Trade Agreement (KORUS-FTA) in 2007, which would increase U.S. 
GDP by at least $10 billion and create more than 345,000 jobs in the United States.324 
In addition, from the social and cultural perspectives, American values and ways 
of thinking have been spread widely and rapidly in the ROK by the hundreds of 
thousands of South Korean students with American educations. Currently over 93,000 
South Korean students (from elementary school to graduate level) are in the United States 
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mic development, democratization, and 
globalization have created a new South Korean collective identity. The people see their 
nation as a
to receive American educations. 325  South Korean foreign students in 2002 alone 
surpassed Japanese foreign students; South Koreans are the third largest group of foreign 
students in the United States, after Indian and Chinese students.326 The large number of 
South Korean foreign students in the United States is significant considering the relative 
size of the ROK’s population compared to India and China’s. In addition, over one 
million ethnic Koreans resided in the United States as of 2003, approximately 1.4 million 
American and South Korean tourists visit each other each year, and the number of South 
Korean immigrants to the United States continues at a high level. More than 530,000 
American tourists visited the ROK in 2003. Approximately 30,000 American soldiers and 
their family members, along with 50,000 American civilians employed in the ROK, play 
a critical role in introducing Korean values and culture to the United States.327 As a result, 
when asked which country has the most similar values, over one-third of the South 
Korean respondents chose the United States, while much less than one-third named either 
Japan or China.328 
In sum, the ROK’s successful econo
 confident, democratic, pragmatic and global major player, and have changed 
their perspective on their traditional ally and enemies. South Koreans no longer believe 
that the North Korean military, ideology, and identity would allow the DPRK to unify the 
Korean peninsula. Although the North Korean regime continues as a source of regional 
threats and instability, South Koreans treat the North Korean people as brothers and 
sisters needing assistance, and see the North Korean leadership as leading their nation 
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outh Korean concerns, 
including rivalry in global markets, conflict over ancient histories, territorial disputes, and 
the PRC’s increased security and econom
despite
                                                
into greater isolation and despair. Since Seoul expanded diplomatic relations with 
Communist countries, the economic and cultural relationship between the ROK and PRC 
has become increasingly interdependent. Although Seoul and Beijing seek a more stable 
and cooperative strategic relationship, many obstacles raise S
ic penetration into the DPRK. On the other hand, 
 some turbulent moments in the mid-1990s and the early 2000s, South Korean 
attitudes toward the United States and the U.S.-ROK alliance have become more stable 
and positive in many respects.329 The majority of South Koreans and Americans see such 
turbulent moments in the past as opportunities to increase their mutual understanding of 
national interests, security priorities, and each other’s domestic constraints.330 In fact, in 
contrast to the ROK of the Cold War era that shared few norms and had little basis for a 
common identity with the United States, today’s South Koreans share a variety of 
common norms and collective identity with Americans.331  
C. U.S.-ROK ALLIANCE COHESION 
The South Korean leadership and public’s ideational changes since the end of the 
Cold War have affected U.S.-ROK alliance cohesion, presenting both challenges and 
opportunities. During the Cold War, the U.S.-ROK alliance was a classic “asymmetric, 
autonomy-security trade-off alliance” in which the United States provided the ROK with 
protection against DPRK aggression in return for influence over the ROK’s military and 
foreign policies. 332  However, the rapid transition of the ROK’s domestic politics, 
economy and society, key influences on South Korean collective identities, have driven 
South Koreans to desire greater respect from Americans and to seek a less asymmetric 
and more mature relationship with the United States to further promote the regional and 
global interests of the two countries. This section of the thesis examines how the military 
aspect of the U.S.-ROK alliance has changed since the end of the Cold War by measuring 
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nology transfer, military-to-military contacts, and combined exercises; and 
(3) eco
 on March 20, 1970, and 
med of the plan during 
his Seo
governmental officials, and both countries’ civilian scholars.334 Washington has sought 
     
it in three dimensions: (1) the level of consensus on security issues between the two 
allies; (2) the frequency, level, and nature of military exchanges and assistance, such as 
arms and tech
nomic contributions to the mutual security of the alliance. 
1. Compromise on Security Issues 
In contrast to realist expectations that the U.S.-ROK alliance would weaken as 
South Koreans became less threatened and more secure, Washington and Seoul have 
resolved the problems between them and successfully consolidated their alliance. In 
terms of the level of consensus on security issues, there are four pieces of significant 
evidence that indicate U.S.-ROK alliance cohesion in the post-Cold War era is stronger 
than during the Cold War era. First, Washington and Seoul have emphasized consultation 
and bilateral coordination when they deal with major issues of mutual security, 
promoting mutual understanding and trust. In the Cold War era, Seoul and the South 
Korean public often believed that most critical changes in security issues, such as the 
structure and role of USFK, policies toward the DPRK, DPRK nuclear issues, transfer of 
operational control, and defense burden-sharing, were initiated unilaterally by 
Washington as its foreign policy altered. For instance, Presidents Nixon and Carter 
announced specific plans for the reduction of USFK in 1969 and 1977 without full 
consultation with Seoul. As a result, most South Koreans were frustrated by 
Washington’s sudden announcement of the reduction of USFK
ROK President Park Chung-hee was upset about not being infor
ul meeting with U.S. Secretary of State William Rogers and the San Francisco 
summit with President Nixon in August 1969.333  Today, security issues are actively 
discussed in an elaborate set of consultative mechanisms, such as the SCM and the 
Military Committee Meeting (MCM) by leaders, practitioner-level to high-level 
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 alliance was dominated by military affairs. 
Thus m
nce development.337  
As a result, Washington and Seoul have reached a number of agreements to 
consolidate the alliance, including the 1990 U.S.-ROK Special Measures Agreement 
(SMA), the 1991 Agreement on Wartime Host Nation Support (WHNS), a 1993 
int 
      
to avoid imposing additional strains on the alliance by consulting frequently with ROK 
officials, putting the discussion of troop redeployments into regular diplomatic 
channels.335 
Second, since the 1990s, Washington and Seoul have enhanced mutual 
coordination and cooperation by diversifying and upgrading the institutional foundations 
of the alliance. Traditionally, the U.S.-ROK
ilitary communication channels, such as the annual SCM, dominated Washington 
and Seoul discussions of military affairs for ROK defense.336 Many additional, efficient 
communication channels have been facilitated since the late 1990s to properly manage 
issues ranging from short-term crises to longer-term strategic plans. These include a 
hotline between two National Security Councils (NSCs) of the United States and ROK, 
the “Big-Four” meeting between the ROK defense and foreign ministers and the U.S. 
ambassador and USFK commander, the Strategic Consultation for Allied Partnership 
(SCAP) between the U.S. secretary of state and ROK foreign minister, the Future of the 
ROK-U.S. Alliance Policy Initiative (FOTA) between officials from various ministries 
and departments (including Defense, State, Foreign Affairs and Trade), and the U.S.-
ROK Security Policy Initiative (SPI). These institutional foundations play a constructive 
role in determining the future direction of the U.S.-ROK alliance. Simultaneously, the 
scope of already existing military channels, such as the SCM and MCM, has significantly 
expanded, focusing not only on reconfirming the U.S. commitment to ROK defense but 
also on mutual efforts for long-term allia
agreement on the armistice operational control’s transfer to the Chairman of ROK Jo
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s since the late 1990s. By 2006, 
Roh Moo-Hyun’s administration saw no problem with a U.S. global military posture that 
highlig stra y on a global scale, and agreed to 
“global
of Staff, revisions in 1991 and 2000 to the original 1967 Status of Forces 
Agreement (SOFA), and agreement in 2005 to the transition of wartime operational 
control to the ROK. 338  In particular, the SMA and the WHNS show the ROK’s 
commitment to the alliance, and the agreement on extending the range and payload of 
South Korean missiles and revising the SOFA helped “nurture a greater public sense of 
U.S. respect for South Korean interests.”339 
Third, both countries have sought to understand the domestic political constraints 
and security concerns of the other and to minimize the divergence of s
orities. For example, from Washington’s perspective, as reflected in the 2001 
QDR, new types of threat produce new strategic challenges and require more strategic 
flexibility and efficiency in U.S. forces overseas, as well as expanded security 
cooperation with its allies and partners.340 With the United States leading the global war 
on terrorism since 2001, the Pentagon emphasizes changes in its military preparedness 
and force-planning paradigm as the most important tasks. For this reason, the United 
States has pursued military transformation, improving long-range force projection and 
strike capabilities, enhancing joint operations, and restructuring U.S. military bases 
overseas. 341   Washington has called for a series of dialogues with Seoul about the 
redeployment of USFK and the realignment of USFK base
hts tegic flexibility, agility and efficienc
ize the scope of the alliance.”342 
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012.  
important indicators of alliance cohesiveness. However, given the already intensive 
military-to-military interactions and exchanges between the two militaries, simply 
On the other hand, South Koreans want greater autonomy in their defense: the so-
called the “Koreanization of ROK defense.”343 A series of consultations between the two 
governments and reassessments of the ROK armed forces’ capabilities led Washington 
and Seoul to agree to replace the American chief representative of the UN Command 
Military Armistice Commission and Commander of the Ground Component Command 
(GCC) of the U.S.-ROK CFC with South Korean Army generals in 1991 and 1992, 
respectively. 344  In addition, the ROK armed forces took over peacetime operational 
control in 1994 and plan to resume wartime operational control in 2
There are many good examples of the improvement of mutual understanding 
between the two governments. For example, with lessons learned from the two school 
girls’ accident in 2002, when an elderly Korean woman pushing a food cart was hit and 
killed by a U.S. military vehicle again in 2005, U.S. officials and agencies dealt with the 
issue in a prompt and proper manner and avoided their earlier mistakes.345 Similarly, 
Washington and USFK seriously considered the historical and economic factors that had 
increased negative South Korean perceptions of the U.S. military bases before making a 
final decision of the relocation of U.S. military bases from the center of the ROK capital 
to Pyeongtaek (for example, the location of USFK in Seoul had been the Japanese 
Imperial Army headquarters between 1910 and 1945).346  
2. Military Exchanges and Assistance 
The frequency, level, and nature of military exchanges and assistance between the 
U.S. and ROK militaries, including U.S. forces stationed on ROK territory, transfer of 
military strategies, tactics, and technologies, and combined and joint exercises, are 
assessing these factors in a quantitative manner does not fully describe changes in the 
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U.S.-R
to invest U.S. $11 billion over four 
years to
from Alaska to the ROK in less than nine hours and extensive use of ports and air bases 
                                                
cohesiveness of the relationship. It is necessary to examine the U.S.-ROK military-to-
military ties in a qualitative manner. As General Leon LaPorte, former Commander of 
OK Combined Forces Command (CFC), has noted, both Americans and South 
Koreans need to look at the U.S. military posture in the ROK “in terms of capabilities 
rather than numbers.”347  Despite the decrease in U.S. troop numbers on the Korean 
peninsula since the end of the Cold War, the quality, level, and nature of military 
exercises and exchanges between the two militaries have increased, resulting in improved 
combined forces operational ability and warfighting sustainability. 
First, the U.S.-ROK combined forces have improved their operational ability and 
warfighting capabilities by intensive modernization. Beginning in the mid-1980s, USFK 
modernized its artillery, anti-tank, air strike, and surveillance capabilities by deploying 
new high-tech platforms, including the M-1 Abrams Tank, multiple rocket launchers 
(MRLs), M-3 Bradley armored vehicles, and F-16, A-10, and OA-37 aircraft.348 At the 
2003 FOTA, the U.S. Department of Defense agreed 
 increase combat capabilities of the U.S.-ROK combined forces.349 Based on this 
agreement, the U.S.-ROK CFC announced in 2004 that its force modernization programs 
had more than 340 enhancements, a more than U.S. $11 billion investment in the ROK. 
The enhancements, intended to increase deterrence against external threats, include 
deployment of the PAC-3 Patriot missile system, AH-64D Apache helicopters, FA-18E/F 
Super Hornets, high-speed transportation assets, improved precision munitions and 
rotational deployment of the U.S. Army’s newest “Stryker” combat unit.350 The Key 
Resolve/Foal Eagle exercise in March 2008 demonstrated the improvement of U.S power 
projection capabilities, including deployment of Stryker units of armored combat vehicles 
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r of bilateral agreements and doctrines, such as war plans, military 
strategi
rrive in the theater. 355  Meanwhile, in case of war, the TPFDD designates various 
flexible deterrence options (FDOs) and force module packages (FMPs), including 
     
in the ROK’s southeast hub, including Pyeongtaek, Busan, Jinhae, Pohang, and 
Daegu.351 
Second, the U.S.-ROK combined forces have modernized their software as well 
as their hardware. In the last two decades, U.S.-ROK combined forces formed an 
enormous numbe
es and tactics, standard operating procedures, rules of engagement and many other 
field manuals. For instance, U.S.-ROK CFC has produced new variants of the basic 
Korean theater war plan (the OPLAN 5027, initially developed in 1973) every other year 
since 1994. 352 The war plan includes a variety of possible war scenarios, operational 
plans, and procedures. Very recently, Washington and Seoul decided to establish working 
groups for the development of OPLAN 5029 in case the DPRK regime collapses.353 At 
the same time, the U.S.-ROK combined forces have concentrated on not only operations 
that constitute a “rigid test of war plan” but also on activities that would produce the 
“greatest benefit for force facing a contingency.”354   
In addition to war plans and doctrines related directly to combat, many 
agreements on mutual logistics support, like the 1991 Agreement of War Host Nation 
Support (WHNS) and Time-Phased Forces Deployment Date (TPFDD), have been added 
in the war plan since 1994. According to the WHNS, to counter any imminent North 
Korean aggression on the Korean peninsula with a short center of gravity and a short 
warning time, U.S. reinforcement troops are immediately deployed in the Korean theater 
in case of contingency and the ROK is to support their logistics until U.S. logistics units 
a
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f U.S. wartime military support in the context of potential 
problem
am Spirit 
(TS) has been suspended since 1994 for the political purpose of improving inter-Korean 
relations,  the  other exercises on the 
Korean
approximately 640,000 U.S. augmentation troops outside the ROK for the U.S.-ROK 
combined forces.356 The significance of this agreement is that it diminishes doubts over 
the timing and scope o
s associated with U.S. Constitutional procedure and real U.S. power projection 
capabilities.357   
Third, based on the hardware and software upgrades of the U.S.-ROK combined 
forces, the nature and quality of U.S.-ROK combined exercises have improved 
significantly, indicating the two allies’ growing commitment to material (military) and 
ideational (political) support for common security objectives. The major U.S.-ROK 
combined exercises, Ulchi Focus Lens (UFL) and Foal Eagle (FE), have quantitatively 
advanced technologies, such as war-gaming tools, C4ISR, common operational pictures, 
and Combined Enterprise Regional Information Exchange-Korea (CENTRIX-
K).358Although the annual combined field training exercise initiated in 1976 Te
 in  same year, the U.S.-ROK CFC enlarged the
 peninsula and began a new, comprehensive large-scale command post exercise 
(CPX), the “Reception, Staging, Onward movement and Integration” exercise (RSOI), to 
enhance the capability of wartime augmentation. The RSOI has increased TPFDD’s 
capabilities from 480,000 augmentation troops in 1994 to 630,000 troops in the late 
1990s. Its recent capability includes 690,000 troops, 160 vessels, and 1,600 aircraft, 
representing almost 40 percent of total U.S. Navy assets, 50 percent of total U.S. Air  
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pating in the 
U.S.-led missile defense (MD) programs against the DPRK’s missile threat.362 
. Economic Contribution to Mutual Security 
xamining the economic contribution to the development of an alliance is also a 
good way to evaluate alliance cohesion. The United States maintains a large number of 
U.S. troops in the ROK with a total stationing cost of over U.S. $2 billion.  The U.S. 
security umbrella since the Korean War has certainly given Seoul the ability to invest its 
large economic savings in other areas. 363  However, in contrast to the ROK’s small 
economic support for the USFK during the Cold War, the ROK has gradually increased 
its economic contribution to enhancing the U.S.-ROK alliance cohesion since the late 
1980s, as the ROK’s economy and governmental financial capacity have grown. This 
trend is mirrored in South Korean public opinion. The majority of South Koreans regard 
the U.S.-ROK alliance as important to their security, and thus strongly support the 
     
Force assets, and 70 percent of total U.S. Marine assets.359 Since 2001, the RSOI has 
been combined with the FE in order to provide better training opportunities to all U
FC echelons.360  
Since the 1990s, the range of U.S.-ROK combined exercises has expanded 
coordination beyond the Korean peninsula theater, showing that both countries share 
common regional and global security objectives. For instance, the ROK Navy has 
participated in periodic bilateral and multinational combat and non-combat maritime 
exercises with the U.S. Navy, including the Rim of the Pacific Exercise (RIMPAC) since 
1990, Tandem Thrust SLOC protection training since 1999, Pacific Reach submarine 
rescue exercise since 2000, Guam anti-submarine warfare exercise since 2007, and the 
U.S.-led Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI) in 2009. 361  In recent years, the Lee 
Myung-bak’s administration has also expressed greater interest in partici
3
E
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presence of USFK. Although the actual number of USFK has gradually declined, U.S. 
military spending on the Korean peninsula and Northeast Asian region has increased. 
First, the ROK has increased its cost sharing contribution to the expenses 
associated with USFK. Based on the 1991 SMA, the ROK agreed to increase its cash and 
non-cash contributions in the four categories of logistics, labor, ROK funded construction 
(ROKFC), and Combined Defense Improvement Projects (CDIP).364 As shown in Figure 
12, between 1989 and 2005, the ROK’s burden-sharing cost has soared at an average 
growth rate of slightly more than 20 percent, with the exception of 1998.365 The ROK’s 
direct financial contribution for 2008 was approximately U.S. $785 million, about 40 
omic 
contribution to USFK’s stationing cost was welcomed by Washington and the U.S. 
Congre
                                                
percent of the total cost of stationing USFK.366 The increase in the ROK’s econ
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 Figure 12.   The ROK’s Contribution to Defense Cost Sharing, 1989–2005.368 
                                                
Second, since the 1990s, the ROK has provided political, military, and financial 
support for the Gulf war, U.S.-led peacekeeping operations, the U.S. global war on 
terrorism, and most recently the U.S.-led war in Iraq. Statistically, between 1990 and 
2008 the ROK sent approximately 75,000 South Korean troops to conduct 15 different 
UN PKO missions. Between 1948 and 1990, only 7,607 South Korean troops, including 
police and civilian contractors, were deployed for five UN PKO missions.369 The ROK 
Ministry of National Defense states that it will enhance and diversify military diplomacy 
to enable the ROK to take on a larger international role and become a “mature world-
class nation” and that it will increase support to PKO from the current level of 390 troops 
to 1,000 or possibly 2,000 by 2012.370 South Korean President Lee Myung-bak says he 
will enact a law to facilitate the dispatching of South Korean troops for UN peacekeeping 
operations, counter-terrorism, counter-proliferation, disaster relief operations, and 
humanitarian operations.371 
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ROK would provide “all 
necessa
States has reduced strains on the ROK’s defense 
budget by pledging to provide massive exercise costs, war reserve stocks, and the 
SIGINT) and C4ISR assets, that the ROK’s current defense 
budget 
In a similar manner, right after the September 11 terrorist attacks, President Kim 
Dae-jung sent a clear message to President Bush that the 
ry cooperation and assistance as a close U.S. ally in the spirit of the ROK-U.S. 
Mutual Defense Treaty.” He sent South Korean troops and U.S. $45 million to assist U.S. 
military actions in Operation Enduring Freedom.372 Roh Moo-hyun’s administration also 
strongly supported the U.S. global war on terrorism, providing additional forces and U.S. 
$260 million in Iraq reconstruction funds between 2003 and 2007.373 In October 2009, 
two years after 23 South Korean missionaries were taken hostage in Afghanistan, Seoul 
made a “bold and courageous” decision to redeploy approximately 100 civilian and 300 
military and police personnel to Afghanistan.374 
At the same time, the United 
advanced signal intelligence (
cannot afford. For instance, the cost of the Team Spirit (TS) exercise to the U.S. 
Air Force alone amounted U.S. $30 million in 1984, and its total cost to the U.S. 
Department of Defense had reached U.S. $150 million by 1991. 375  Despite the 
suspension of TS in 1994, the combined cost of all exercises has continued to increase 
since the 1990s. In addition, the U.S. War Reserve Stocks for Allies in the ROK (WRSA-
K) constitutes approximately 60 percent of the ammunition required in wartime. At the 
40th SCM in 2008, Washington and Seoul signed the “WRSA-K transfer Memorandum of 
Agreement” to enhance ROK’s warfighting sustainability.376 According to this MOA, the 
ROK will purchase nearly half of WRSA-K for about one-tenth of the original price, paid 
with labor and services for USFK rather than transfer of hard currency.377 Similarly, 
USFK maintains extensive surveillance and reconnaissance by military satellites and 
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undertaken a series of 
intensive m
logy, and warfighting sustainability. At the same time, 
the decline of DPRK’s overall power has reduced South Koreans’ threat perception. For 
           
reconnaissance aircrafts over the DPRK, and provides “24-hour, all-weather, real-time, 
multi-sensor” intelligence information to the ROK military.378 
Recently, the U.S. Congress passed the “U.S.-Republic of Korea Defense 
Cooperation Improvement Act of 2008” granting the ROK the same treatment in its FMS 
status as the “NATO Plus Three group (Australia, Japan, and New Zealand)” that have 
lighter scrutiny and higher threshold levels for U.S. defense sales. This creates a new 
“NATO Plus Four group.” 379  This bill remedies a long-overdue disparity in 
Washington’s characterization of its military allies by recognizing the ROK’s strategic 
importance to U.S. security objectives in Asia.380 More recently, the U.S. Department of 
Defense announced investments of U.S. $11 million over the next 10 years for joint 
development of the ROK military.381 
D. CONCLUSION 
Realists argue that the balance of power and threat between the ROK and DPRK 
in the post-Cold War era has shifted favor of the South, which has achieved rapid military 
modernization based on its remarkable economic prosperity, advanced scientific 
technologies, and strong ties with the U.S., the world’s most formidable military and 
economic power. The ROK Ministry of National Defense has 
ilitary reforms since the mid-1970s to improve the ROK’s arms procurement, 
indigenous development of sophisticated weapons and capacity for self-reliant defense, 
increasing the military power gap between the North and South. Meanwhile, since the 
collapse of the Soviet Union the DPRK has suffered a deteriorating economy, diplomatic 
isolation and devastating famines. As a result, the DPRK cannot catch up to ROK 
military’s modernization, and the KPA has become inferior to the ROK armed forces in 
terms of military spending, techno
                                      
378 Levin, Do the Ties Still Bind? 17. 
379 Jeff Abramson, “U.S. Arms Notifications Spike in 2008,” Arms Control Today, Vol. 39 (March 
2009), http://www.armscontrol.org/act/2009_03/arms_2008 (accessed October 10, 2009). 
380 Klingner, “Supporting Our South Korean Ally and Enhancing Defense Cooperation,” 1. 
381 Hwang, “Minding the Gap: Improving U.S.-ROK Relations,” 4. 
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these reasons, realists predict that the U.S.-ROK alliance will lose its common rationale, 
substance, and purpose, and thus become weaker than during the Cold War era. 
owever, this thesis finds that South Korean self-perception and view of others 
has changed, as has Seoul’s perspective on security issues on and off the Korean 
peninsula. South Koreans have witnessed a series of sea changes in their economy, 
politics, security and society in the 1980s and 1990s. Rising South Korean self-
confidence and activism in domestic and international affairs, incre itment to 
democratic and arket sul ro  gen al, a
cha nd  n sm or ’s
to the DPRK, PRC and United States. Consequently, the ons, trategies of 
the U.S.-ROK combined forces and of ROK armed forces inside and outside of the 
Korean theater have also changed, based not only on r ial s bu
ideational variables. Despite the decline of the perceived threat from the DPRK and PRC 
and increased South Korean feelings of brotherhood toward North Koreans since the 
2001 inter-Korean summit, the DPRK and PRC still remain problematic for the ROK’s 
interests and security because of their inconsistent and ambiguous behavior. In contrast, 
South Korean attitudes toward the United States and U.S.-ROK alliance are clo
w pite nce in
 a consequence, both Washington and Seoul have sought to improve the 
variety of new, ef
ombined forces have worked more closely and intensively to upgrade both peacetime 
and wartime operational capabilities throughout a series of modernizations for not only 
hardware but also software of the combined forces, including high-tech assets, doctrines, 
and combined exercises. 
Taking these factors into account, Table 10 summarizes the values of the key 
variables of material (realist) and ideational (constructivist) approaches. The table 
demonstrates that the cohesiveness of the U.S.-ROK alliance during the post-Cold War 
era cannot be explained by external threats and interests and highlights instead the 
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Table 10.   Values of key material and ideational variables and expectations of the U.S.-ROK 
alliance cohesion in comparative perspective. 
 
 111
THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK 
 112
alliances. However, previous studies have been 
domina
s state identity with the support of other nations. By 
 isolationism and brinkmanship, resisting changes in its 
identity
V. CONCLUSION 
This thesis addresses the determinants of cohesion or discord in the Northeast 
Asia alliances in which the United States has major security interests. While the average 
duration of alliances is less than ten years, the PRC-DPRK and U.S.-ROK alliances have 
both lasted for more than a half century. Numerous studies have explored the rationale, 
substance and purpose of these 
ted by realists and related balance of power or threat approaches. In explaining 
contemporary changes within the alliances, relatively little attention has been given to 
alternative approaches such as social constructivism. 
By applying social constructivist theory to the PRC-DPRK and U.S.-ROK 
alliances in a comparative study, this thesis finds that ideational factors and processes 
play a significant role in determining the closeness of the alliances. The thesis defined the 
collective identity of a state as a set of broadly accepted representations of the state 
shaped by the public’s self-perception and their perceptions of others. The thesis 
examined changes in the collective identities of China and South Korea, focusing on their 
political, economic and social transformation over the years, increasing self-confidence 
and nationalism, and attitudes held by a broad range of ordinary citizens and government 
officials toward the international community and traditional allies and enemies.  
In the PRC-DPRK alliance, Beijing has taken the domestic and international 
challenges and threats of the 1980s and 1990s as an opportunity for modernization, 
globalization, and development of it
contrast, Pyongyang has turned to
. The opposing direction of these two states’ identities has a significant impact on 
their relations and security strategies, with increasingly large differences emerging in 
their perceptions of common interests and security. The divergence in their perception of 
their interests has led to growing mistrust and discord in their bilateral political, 
diplomatic and military relations. Beijing is reluctant to maintain the old style of 
friendship as long as Pyongyang continues to damage the PRC’s interests. The frequency, 
level, and nature of the PRC-DPRK military-to-military contacts and mutual exchanges 
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e those between the United States and Japan, the United 
States a
and assistances have significantly reduced and weakened. The PRC wants to change the 
relationship, provided that revision of the treaty does not create instability in the DPRK. 
Unless Beijing or Pyongyang decides to go in a completely new direction, the Sino-
DPRK alliance will be unable to transform the one-way relationship between a reluctant 
patron (Beijing) and an aid-seeking client (Pyongyang) to the healthy, reciprocal 
relationship found in alliances lik
nd the ROK, and in NATO. 
In the U.S.-ROK alliance, Seoul has turned the challenges of the 1980s and 1990s 
into an opportunity to democratize, globalize, and develop its state identity with the 
support of the United States. At the same time, South Koreans are increasingly willing 
and able to proactively engage in regional and global security affairs to support 
democracy, free market economics, and human rights. As a result, despite problems in 
the U.S.-ROK alliance in the post-Cold War era, such as massive anti-American protests 
and politically and socially sensitive issues regarding USFK, both South Koreans and 
Americans have managed their problems in ways that allow the alliance to grow stronger 
and more prosperous, and have consolidated their understanding in a variety of arenas, 
including politics, economics, military affairs, and culture. These ideational changes and 
the increasing convergence between American and South Korean thought have 
encouraged Washington and Seoul to develop a more equal and mature relationship that 
promotes reciprocal and responsible commitments to the common values and interests 
underlying the alliance. The result is improvement in the quality of U.S.-ROK 
cooperation on mutual security, military exchanges and assistance, and economic 
contributions to the alliance. 
Notwithstanding some research limitations posed by the absence of additional 
comparative case studies, this thesis has two important theoretical implications. First, 
current changes in the cohesiveness or discord of the Northeast Asia alliances have been 
affected more by ideational variables than by material variables. Although both the PRC-
DPRK and U.S.-ROK alliances were created and maintained by a realist rationale, the 
ideational changes in Chinese and South Korean collective identities have direct and 
cies, indirect impacts on the decision-making processes of their respective foreign poli
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changing alliance cohesion. Chinese and South Koreans’ rapidly growing self-confidence, 
pragmatism, and activism in domestic and international affairs, their commitment to 
regional and international security institutions, and their favorable perspectives of 
international political and economic values are increasingly important ideational factors 
in their perceptions of power, threat, interests, and values—all of which ultimately affect 
PRC and ROK foreign policies. 
Second, shared identity, norms, values, cultures, and feelings of affinity between 
allies can be constructed and developed through a wide range of political, economic, 
social, cultural, and military interactions. Despite the advantages of cultural affinity and 
geographical proximity, the PRC-DPRK alliance lacks mutual efforts to build common 
values, and thus the gap in government and public attitudes toward the future of the 
alliance in the two countries has widened. In contrast, the U.S.-ROK alliance has become 
stronger and healthier with the evolution of shared values of democracy, free market 
economy, rule of law, and respect for human dignity and freedom, all of which lead to 
greater convergence of public opinion on the future of the alliance. 
This study offers five policy recommendations for enhancing alliance cohesion in 
the future. First, ideational variables should be heavily weighted in foreign policy 
decision-making processes. Traditionally dominated by realist theories, the field of 
international relations has largely ignored ideational variables. However, in recent years a 
growing body of evidence, including the cases of the allies examined in this study, 
supports the importance of ideational factors like self-perception and the perceptions of 
others in international politics. It is important to recognize that it typically takes a fairly 
long time for state identity to be formulated and become visible to outsiders, and thus 
once a state identity is consolidated, it is very difficult to change. In light of this, policy 
makers should consider the importance of ideational factors and define their long-term 
vision and objectives for the alliance to create a favorable environment and at the same 
time prevent negative repercussions of policy decisions. The “Joint Vision for the U.S.-
ROK Alliance” 382 proposed by President Obama and Lee Myung-bak in June 2009 is a 
                                                 
382 Office of the Press Secretary of the White House, “Joint Vision for the Alliance of the United 
States of America and the Republic of Korea,” June 16, 2009, http://www.whitehouse.gov/.  
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emphasize dialogue and consultation, especially when they face difficulties. In addition, 
both the U.S. and the ROK have established numerous channels of communication, from 
the highest levels down to the level of the working groups; their discussion agendas 
good example. It accommodates changes in ideational variables in both countries and 
presents a roadmap for a mature alliance with robust public support in the future.  
Second, alliances thrive and prosper when they share firm common values. If they 
lack common values, or existing values do not suit the new international environment, 
both sides of an alliance should put constant effort into constructing new values and 
encouraging their people to recognize the importance of common alliance values.  There 
is no such thing in life as a totally problem-
alliance shows, without firm shared values, it is difficult to overcome problems 
and deepen ties. In contrast, despite gloomy predictions in 1994 and 2002 that the U.S.-
ROK alliance was in trouble, Washington and Seoul resolved their issues based on their 
strong shared belief in democracy, free market economies, peace and stability in the 
region, nonproliferation, anti-terrorism, human rights, and rule of law.  When the United 
States and the ROK focused on the alliance’s narrow rationale of defending the ROK 
against North Korean aggression on the Korean peninsula, they often faced conflicts 
between U.S. global security priorities and the ROK’s national security priorities. 
Examples include the issues of reducing USFK, the “tripwire” function for USFK, an
ive DPRK policies. Once Americans and South Koreans began to expand their 
shared values into areas beyond the military, security and the Korean peninsula—the 
future purpose, objectives, missions, roles, and required capabilities of the alliance— 
their alliance cohesion strengthened significantly. 
Third, allies should focus not only on material alliance management but also on 
consolidating the alliance’s ideational foundation by improving the quantity and quality 
of dialogue and communication at all levels of government and society and by enhancing 
intercultural awareness. A good relationship starts with meeting and associating with 
people. When a relationship starts to go bad, more dialogue and communication are 
required. The PRC and DPRK suspended regular senior-level meetings a number of times 
as a way of condemning each other’s misbehavior. In contrast, Washington and Seou
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include heavy, sensitive issues as well as lighter topics. Furthermore, increasing the 
quantity and quality of physical contact, dialogue, and communication between the 
government and the public helps increase cultural awareness, reduce prejudice, and 
promote mutual respect between allies. For instance, the governments and civilian 
organizations of the United States and the ROK have begun discussing SOFA revisions, a 
dialogue that requires a profound understanding of the gaps between the allies’ legal and 
jurisdictional systems going back to the 1990s. 
Fourth, public support has a critical role in developing alliance cohesion. In the 
information era, public awareness of domestic and international affairs and public 
participation in politics are growing. Even in authoritarian countries like the PRC, public 
opinion has become a critical factor in policy making.  Members of an alliance need to 
coordinate with each others’ public diplomacy efforts to highlight the significance of the 
alliance and their mutual commitment to common interests. At the same time, they need 
to listen to public re primary source of 
information for younger generations, and take a proactive role by correcting inaccurate 
information about and introducing positive perspectives on their allies and the alliance.  
Finally, in addition to sharing common values to minimize the gaps in ideas 
between allies, demonstrating reciprocal and balanced responsibilities and commitments 
to mutual security helps to create the kind of strong alliance cohesion seen in the U.S.-
ROK alliance since the 1990s. Unlike the PRC and the DPRK, the U.S. and the ROK 
have successfully transformed a one-way, asymmetric relationship into a more equal 
partnership, with the ROK taking more responsibility for regional and global security and 
the United States giving more consideration to South Korean security concerns and 
domestic political constraints, and supporting South Korea’s potential to play a greater 
role on the global stage. Although the United States and South Korea should not take 
their alliance for granted, the alliance currently rests on a strong foundation and with a 
modest effort at maintaining communication can be kept strong for many years to come. 
actions to the media, in particular the Internet, the 
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